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Hidden  taxes on  the financial svstem, such as  interest rate
ceilings, reserve requiremilents,  and the currency tax are often
heavier than explicit taxes. Interest rate ceilings may distort fi-
nancial intermediation more than other taxes.
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To measure distorting taxes (cxplicit and im-  By any reckoning, the financial sector has
plicit) on the financial sector of five African  been more heavily taxed than other sectors.
countries, Chamicy and Honohan view taxation  Even cxcluding the currency tax, which does not
morc broadly than is customary.  directly affect the banking system, taxes col-
lected avcraged the equivalent of several times
They go beyond thc currencv tax and reserve  the value added of' the banking system in the
requirements to include the quasi-tax effects of'  threc high-tax countrics. That is a serious
intcrest rate ceilings.  Under this broader ap-  disincentive to linancial intcnmediation and
proach, thc true scalc of taxation on rinainciall  surely too high for cconomic crficicncy.
intermcdiation is much higher than is commonly
appreciated.  Dil'tcrent types of tax distort ')lhavior
diffe'crnitly. In relatively Icss developed finan-
The level of tax has varied widely over timc  cial markets suchi  as hie five studied, intciest rate
and between countrics, but has bcen a significaint  ceilings may impose higher welf'are  costs than
element  in total governmient  revenues,  cspecially  explicit  taxes or reserve  requircmentis.
during fiscal crises induced by commoditv
slumps.  Between 1978 and 1988, this kindi  of'  Surges in inillation  in the five countries
tax accounited  for an average 4 percent to 7  correlated witlh  high taxes on thc financial
percent of GDP in three of thc less macroccon-  sector.  CGovernimes  rcfomiing taxes on the
omically stable cconomics (Ghana, Nigeria, and  finzacial system should consider building in
Zambia) and close to 2 percent of G,DP  in the  mechanisms (adijusting  administered interest
two morc stable economics sampled (C76tc  rates, for example, or moving to explicit, such as
d'lvoire and Kenya).  Expressed as a percentage  valuc-add  ed, taxes) to reduce the sensitivity ol'
of M2, the tax rate has gone as high as 9()  financial sector taxes to thc inflation rale.
percent.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The wide variety of financial structures and financial experience in sub-
Saharan Africa motivates our study.  Most countries in the region have expe-
rienced boom aiid  bust cycles in their primary export products and this has
contributed to macroeconomic imb4lances.  In several countries the result has
been a very variable inflationary experience, with episodes during which
financial intermediation has been carried out under the most difficult cir-
cumstances, particularly when inflationary surges  have been accompanied by
nominal ceilings on interest rates.  Other countries - notably, but not
exclusively, those in the Franc and Rand zones - have experienced low infla-
tion in  most years.
Although the authorities may not have thought of themselves as doing so, they
have, to a greater or lesser extent, been imposing taxes on financial inter-
mediation.  The purpose of this study is to set out a practical method for
analyzing how inflation, interest ceilings, reserve requirements and like
impositions  have had tax-like effects and how they can be compared with
explicit taxes.  Using this method we compute estimates of the varying magni-
tudes of the total taxation of financial intermediation in five African econ-
omies during recent years.  Our study has continued by exploring the
macroeconomic and fiscal dynamics which, in our view, have contributed to the
use of heavy taxation on the financial sector in certain countries and for
certain periods.  Finally we examine the likely impact of these taxes on
efficiency.
12 FINANCIAL SECTOR  'AXATION:  DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT
2.1 Explicit and implicit taxes
T.n  most countries a variety of tax and quasi-fiscal instruments affect
financial institutions and financial intermediation.  Some are explicit
taxes and are included in the tax code.  Others are not defined explicitly
and are not treated as taxes in the budget accounting.  Yet these implici-
forms of taxation, or quasi-taxes, can be the  most powerful tools for
generating revenues from the financial system.  The debate on the taxation
of financial system and on seignorage is often confusing because the fiscal
instruments are not properly defined.
Explicit taxes.  Included among the explicit taxes  may be any or all of:
- tax on gross receipts of banks,
- value  added  tax,
- tax on  loan  balances,
- taxes on bank transactions (e.g.  stamp duties),
- tax on bank  profits.
These taxes are all included in the tax code and in  budgetary accounting.
As with other taxes, the rates may change, but the changes tend to be
relatively small.  Furthermore, any changes are normally announced in
advance and specified as part of the tax code.  The amount of revenue that
such explicit taxes on the financial system generates may be significant,
but rarely exceeds five per cent of the amount of financial assets.
In our calculations of explicit taxation  we concentrate on the taxes
imposed on interest income or on value added.  Transactions taxes are both
small in the sample countries and arguably of minor importance in the
context of intermediation services.  Bank profits taxes are part of the
normal income tax code (subject  to a caveat noted below).
In addition to explicit taxes on the financial sector (and generally dwarf-
ing these in 5.mportance)  are other forms of government intervention such as
interest rate ceilings, reserve requirements and the implicit tax on
currency holdings.  Though there are other reasons for some of -. hese inter-
ventionsl, their main objective is to secure credit for the government
itself or for preferred sectors at lower than market interest rates.
Presumably the government could achieve the same allocation of credit by
1 It is hard to find a convincing argument that such quasi-fiscal instruments
are corrective measures rather than d:storting ones.
2paying market rates of interest on its own borrowings and by subsidizing
the use of credit by the preferred sectors.  But this  would be at the cost
of imposing taxation elsewhere in the economy to cover the additional bud-
getary cost.  Therefore they can be seen as implicit taxation.
In our sample of countries, the main implicit or quasi-taxes are
- the tax on currency,
- reserve requirements or forced lending imposed on commercial banks
and carrying below-market interest rates,
- interest ceilinas on bank loans and deposits.
Unlike explicit taxes, the implicit  ones do not belong to tbe tax code and
are not included in the budget.  They are imposed at variable rates not
specified in advance and difficult to measure even after the evert.  They
tend to generate very variable - and sometimes  very large - flows of reve-
nue, sometimes even greater than 100 percent per annum of the initial value
of the asset being taxed.
Since the rates are so variable, it is  not clear how well thev are antici-
pated by market participants and thus  how exactly they enter into  behav-
ioral decisions in the market.  This can make it difficult for governments
to pursue a time-consistent pol;.y with regard to such taxes 2.
Tax on currency.  Urnder  this h,ading is entered the implicit tax imposed  on
holders of currency by virtue of the fact that, unlike other forms of
government debt, currency  ioes  not pay interest.  The higher the rate of
anticipated inflation, the  higher the nominal interest rate that is  being
avoided.  Government can avoid paying interest on currency because it
retains a monopoly of issue, and it is this monopoly profit that consti-
tutes tne tax.  The currency tax is often referred to as seignorage (a term
which, as explained in a later sectinn, has several different but closely
related meanings).
Note that the institution of currency does provide intermediation services.
The holding of currency represents a very liquid claim - much more liquid
than other forms of lending to the government, and it transfers loanable
funds from the holder to the government.  For this reason we have not
hesitated to include the currency tax as part of the taxation of financial
intermediation.
2 A government abjuring a surprise inflation may not be credible; the market
may discount such "surprise" inflations anyway.
3Ra.tce  regmr-a-r.  In many countries, though not all, the Central Bank
requir.-i  banks to respect certain minimum or maximum balance sheet ratios.
Some of these are purely prudential ratios, such as  the minimum ratio of
shareholeers  funds to risi assets, or _he  minimum ratio of liquid assets
to liquid liabilities, ur the maximum share of capital committed to any one
borrower.  Others have a function in monet-ry zcntrol, especially the spec-
ification of a minimum holding of designated reserve assets.  Yet others
amount to a forced investment in specified assets for the purpose of
sectoral credit policy.
In general, a well-designed set of prudential  requirements do not bite ir.
the case of a bank which is operating in a "safe and sound" manner. Indeed
for many developing countries the recommendation  would be to increase the
severity of the requirements and their enforcement.  Therefore, sucn
requirements should be seen as corrective rather than distortionary and
they are therefore excluded from the scope of our study.
The use of reserve requirements for monetary  control  follows a variety of
models, but the essential feature is the imposition of a requirement on
each bank to hold a minimum amount (in  proportion to either credit out-
standing or deposit l.iabtlities)  of specified reserve assets, usually
including  vault currency and specified deposits with the Central Bank.  The
total supply of the reserve assets is  potentially under the control of the
Central Bank.  If the requirement is  biting, then by altering the supply of
reserve assets, the Central Bank can achieve a change in the monetary
aggregate (credit or deposits) to  which the required rr.tio  is expressed.
A system of reserve requirements is sometimes held to  be more effctive  if
it involves a slight penalty, ensuring that the requirement bites.
Typically, however, the designated reserves all carry a very low interest
rate - often zero - with the effect that the penalty bites more than is
necessary.  In effect the difference between the  market interest rates on
.short-term  securities and the interest  rate (if any) paid on the designated
reserves represents a tax.  Once again, as in the case of currency, the
government is borrowing at below market interest rates.
Some may argue that, since  banks would hold some cash reserves anyway and
considerir.g  the high liquidity of the reserve assets, these assets should
not bear a high interest rate.  However, minimum vault cash needs for banks
are very small.  Furthermore, the reserve assets are not all that liquid
considering that they are not available, dollar for dollar, to meet a
4de.osft  withdrawal  so long  as the  reserve  requirement  remains  in effect.
For the  most  part the  reserves  absorb  resources  that  would  otherwise  be
lent  out  at a remunerative  rate  of interest.
The tax equivalent of inre et  rate ceilines. In many countries there are
ceilings  on  bank lending  rates.  These  serve  a  variety  of  policy  objectives.
For  instance,  they  may inhibit  unsustainable  speculative  or  distress  bor-
rowing  by unsound  banks. But  in  many  cases  the  interest  rate  ceilings  are
well  below  what  would  be market-clearing  rates  even  in the  absence  of such
prudential  problems. The gap  between  the  market-clearing  rate  and  the
ceiling  can  be considered  as  a tax.
To the  extent  that  government  is the  borrower,  the  benefit  of the  tax  goes
directly  tc it.  Were it  not  for  the  interest  rate  ceiling,  the  government
would  have to  pay  out  more in  interest;  the  adoitional  expenditu.e  would
eventually  have to  be covered  by some  tax.  So the  interest  rate  ceiling
acts  as  a substitute  for  an explicit  tax. Alternatively,  one  can  see  that
a ceiling  on  bank lending  rates  is  equivalent  to a situation  where,  though
there  is no ceiling,  the  government  imposes  a tax  equivalent  to the  differ-
ence  between  the  ceiling  and the  market  clearing  rate  of interest.
When the  borrower  is  not the  government,  the  proceeds  of the  tax  are  effec-
tively  earmarked  for  the  favored  borrower. Note that  not  all  potential
borrowers  can  get  the  loans  they  would  demand  at the  distorted  irterest
rate;  there  will  be rationing. Hence  the  benefit  does  not go to  borrowers
as a  whole,  but only  those  who  are  successful  in  obtaining  credit. In the
case  of a ceiling  on deposit  interest  rates,  the  proceeds  of the  tax  goes
to the  bank.  (In  either  case,  the  ultimate  incidence  of the  tax  is,  of
course,  a dlfferent  matter.)
Eguilibrim response  2f th  financial  system  to  taxes. All  of these  taxes
will  have repercussions  through  the  firancial  system,  as it  responds  to
altered  incentives.  As an illustration  of  how a  developing  country  finan-
cial  system  might  respond  to these  taxes,  a simple  formal  model  has  been
developed,  and is  described  in  Appendix  1.  It is  confined  to the  steady
state  and  shows  how  uncontrolled  interest  rates,  bank lending  and  screening
behavior  and  the  government's  budget  may  be affected  by such  taxes. The
model  assumes  that  bank lending  rates  are  controlled  and  that  reserve
requirements  are  in effect,  but  that  deposit  rates  are  freely  negotiated.
It also  examines  the  effect  of a tax  on  bank interes-t  receipts  and  of
policy-induced  changes  in the  rate  of inflation.
5The analysis suggests that different taxes will affect the system in dif-
ferent ways.  For instance, the model predicts that changes in reserve
requirements or in the government bill rate3  will alter deposit interest
rates, but will leave lending behavior by the banks unchanSed.  In con-
trast, a change in the ceiling on lending interest rates affects the total
quantity of bank lending and the effort made by banks to screen lending
proposals, but leaves deposit interest rates unchanged.
While these predictions are model-specific, they do suggest that the wel-
fare implications of financial sector taxation  may depend on the exact mix
of taxes and quasi-taxes, and not simply to the total tax take from the
financial sector.  These points are taken up in a later section.
Other Implicit Taxes There are other implicit taxes or subsidies that are
relevant for the financial system,  but which we do not include in our
calculations:
(i)  Differential effect of direct taxes. Income tax can affect the
financial syscem differentially from other parts of the economic sys-
tem to the extent that it is collected more effectively from that
sector, with other sectors escaping with a lower actual burden.  This
can be an important consideration, especially so far as withholding
taxes on interest  paid are concerned.  However, improvements in tax
administration should mean that the degree to which tax collection
from other sectors is less effective will decline over time.  Accord-
ingly, this issue may best be seen as a distortion arising from the
failure to collect other taxes adequately.
(ii)  Deposit insurance and protection fees.  An increasin« number of
countries are adopting explicit deposit insurance or deposit protec-
tion schemes.  Banks pay a fee, but if the fee is lower than the risk
involved, the existence of insurance may be regarded as a net subsidy
to the financial sector.  Explicit deposit insurance  has not been part
of the sample systems during the bulk of the period under review.
(iii) Ex post bail-ogts of failing  banks,  Use of large budgetary
funds to bail-out the depositors and sometimes other claimants on
failing banks has happened or in progress in twost  of the countries in
our sample and in  many others too.  The sums can be very large in
relation to o.ne-year's  GNP - as much as 10 per cent or more in a few
cases.  To some extent the  bail-outs can be seen as an offset to the
implicit taxes, and this may even have been intended by the authori-
ties.  However, their incidence is  unlikely to be exactly symmetrical
to the taxes.  Provided they are a prelude to improved supervision
3 This result assumes the existence of a government bill or bond which is
freely traded.  If no such bill exists, the response of ban,b  lending, bank
deposit rates and bank intermediation  behavior, will be quite different: a
change in lending rate ceilings  will be transmitted to deposit rates, and a
change in reserve requirements  will affect lending behavior, though only to
the extent by which the marginal wedge to intermediation  cost! is altered.
These differences indicate that the likely imnact of different taxes depends
on the degree to which free markets are available to banks and non-banks.
6and regulation of the banking system so that the failures are unlikely
to recur, ex post bail-outs can arguably be seen as a lump-sum sub-
sidy, with no direct impact  on intermediation  costs'.
(iv)  Other rents provide  to banks,  Examples of thesc would be the
rents conferred on banks by virtue of restrictions on entry, and the
value of foreign exchange allocations piovided at false prices.  The
former is potentially quite important, and it is noteworthy that
interest zate liberalization in several of the countries of the sample
was accompanied  by a widening of bank margins.  On the latter, the
severe mis-valuation of foreign exchange In several of the countries
in the sample resulted in  much rent-seeking activity.  In the case of
Nigeria huge profits accrued to privile  geo banks through this channel.
These subsidies do not, however, directly relate to intermediation,
which is the main concern of this paper.
(v)  Sectoral credit euidelines.  Several governments pursue sectoral
credit objectives through moral suasion.  Even when no special rate of
interest is mandated for the credit (or  when any subsidy is funded by
the government or by low-interest rediscounts) such requirements, if
enforced, can involve an transfer from the non-preferred sectors and
thus represent a form of impiicit earmarked tax5.  Such sectoral pro-
grams are enforced with varying degrees of severity; deviations from
the targets are common. This, combined with the extreme difficulty of
quantifying the size of the transfer leads  us to conclude that the
safest simplification is to assume that they are not binding as a tax.
2.2 Some definitional issues
2.2.1  Measurements.
In line with the previous discussion, the measurements presented in this
paper fall under four headings:  (a) the currency tax.  (b)  below-market
interest on compulsory reserve requirements and other forced investments
by banks.  (c)  below-market ceilings on bank interest rates.  (d)
4 In some cases they can also be seen as a partial compensation for the
implicit  burden placed on the financial system by pressuring it to make
polit.cally motivated loans that  were never repaid.
5 The most severe type of directed credit program would specify the borrowers
and the interest rates - far below martet - at which these  borrowers are to
obtain funding.  Less severe would b' a  requirement to lend a certain share
of resources to particular sectors,  gain at below the interest rates charged
to non-preferred borrowers, with the preferential interest rate financed from
the banks' operations.  Both of these types of constraints are analogous to
reserve requirements and are considerably more onerous than the sectoral
'equirements. To the extent that such requirements have been imposed in the
countries being studied, they have not been explicitly documented.  Clearly
there have been many loans made at the behest of powerful political groups,
and their poor performance has undoubtedly contributed to the w.despread bank
failures.  We have, however, refrained from assuming, in our measures, that
the losses of the banking system over the years could be wholly or partly
assigned to this political interference in the credit process, and from
counting them as one of our implicit taxes.
7explicit  tax3s  collected  from  banks. Quantifying  these  taxes  in a  cred-
ible  way is  not  easy. Apart  from  the  problems  of gathering  reliable
data there  is  the  conceptual  difficulty  of  measuring  the  market  clearing
rate  of interast  on short-term  risk-free  paper  (r*)  which  is  the  key
variable. We cannot  hope to  estimate  it precisely,  especially  in  very
distorted  market  conditions.  Several  approaches  were  explored:
Measure  1  begins  with the  idea  that  the  expected  rate  of inflation  as  a
guide  to likely  market  clearing  nominal  interest  rates  on the  assumption
that  in  equilibrium  the  market  clearing  rate  of interest  is  normally
positive,  though  it  might  ba small6. This  assumption  is implemented  by
taking  actual  inflation  as a proxy  for  expected  inflation  and  taking  it
that  the  market  clearing  rate  of interest  is  at least  one  per  cent
higher. Specifically  we took  r* to  be one  per  cent  above  the  actual
future  inflation  rate 7, except  where  this  was lower  th'n  the  actual
interest  rate  on treasury  billss,  in  which  case  r*  was  set  equal  to  the
actual  rate.
Measure  2 adopts  a different  and  more subjective  approach. For  it  we
attempted  to identify  periods  eduring  which  the  comparative  absence  of
interest  rate  controls  could  justify  the  assumption  that  actual  rates
during  those  periods  were close  to market  clearing  rates. The  jump  in
interest  rates  which  occurred  at the  beginning  of  such  periods  of liber-
alization  was taken  as a  measure  of the  gap  between  actual  and  market
clearing  interest  rates  for  other  periods. Thus  measure  2 assumes  that
the  degree  of  repression  was constant  outside  of the  periods  identified
as liberal.
Measure  3 takes  the  actual  foreign  interest  rate  adjusted  for  actual
exchange  rate  change 9 as a  measure  of r*,  while  Measure  4  differs  only
by using  the  parallel  market  exchange  rate  instead  of the  official  one.
These  two  measures  are  marred  by the  fact  that  sharp  movements  in the
6  Note,  for  example,  the  often  quoted  figures  for  US Treasury  bills,  the
annual  average  real  yield  on which  during  the  the  second  and  third  quarters
of the  century  was as lictle  as 0.2  per cent.
7  Actually  we used  the  continuously  compounded  rate  equivalent  to four-
quarter  inflation.  Using  four  quarters  instead  of,  say,  one  has the  advan-
tage  of making  the  measure  robust  to noir  in the  data;  but it also  nmeans
that  the  measure  has difficulty  in  pinpoi..ing  the  timing  of rapid  changes  in
taxation  as occurred  in Zambia  1984-87.
8 For  Cote  d'Ivoire,  where  there  are  no treasury  bills,  the  official  money
market  rates  were  used.
9 This is  close  to the  approach  adopted  by Giovannini  and  de  Melo (1989)
8value of the 1IS$  in the early 1980s were not discounted in advance by
international  money markets.  Accordingly, interest rates in, for exam-
pLe, most European centers were far  below what Measure 3 would give as
the market clearing rate for 1979-83.
Measure  5  takes tl-e  growth in  base money as a rough indicator of
expected inflation' 0 and assumes that r* is one per cent higher.
Our judgment is that the measure 1 results are probably the most usetul
and trustworthy.  The degree of subjectivity involved in measure 2 makes
it difficult to assess impartially; on average it gives lower rates of
tax than measure 1.  Measures 3 and 4 are marred by the unanticipated
swings in industrial country exchange rates: in practice these measures
gave the highest estimated tax revenue.  Measure 5 provides a kind of
check on the other measures; like measures 1 and 2, it shows Ghana,
Nigeria and Zambia as having the overall highest rates of tax.
Apart from measure 2, all of the measures consie3red share the feature
that, &t least to some extent they identify actual with expected.  Thus
what may truly have been surprise  inflations are taken as having been
anticipated.  Of course the tax was levied anyway, but its effect on
behavior does depend on whether it  was anticiFated.  It may therefore  be
that the measures presented overstate anticipated tax rates.
(a) Currency tax.  The tax base is the total currency in circulation
outside banks (bank  holdings come under reserve requirements).  The tax
rate is taken to be one below r*, described above (the one per cer.t
being a provision for costs of ma4nt.'ning the currency issue).  For
reference we also calculate the tradit 4onal cash flow measure of seigno-
rage: the change in the money stock.
(b) Below-market interest on bank reserves.  For reserve requirements
satisfied by holding Central Bank or government obligations, the tax
rate is taken to be the difference between the interest rate paid
(mostly  zero) and the market-clearing rate for this kind of instrument,
effectivuly r*.  In addition we decided to include (the generally small
amount of) excess reserves on the grounds that these would have been
remunerated in a market environment.
10 Of course this is a very rough measure: base money growth would be
influenced  by GDP growth, as weIl as by the forces of financial innovation.
9(c)  Ceilings on bank interest rates.  Here again the problem is to
assess the level of the equilibrium interest rate that would be deter-
mined in a free-i.arket. Clearly market clearing rates for bank loans
are generally  ,newhat  higher than those for risk-free assets.  The
picture is complicated by the  possibility that adverse selection consid-
erations could result in some equilibrium credit rationing of the
Stiglitz-Wei.ss  type for higher risk loan categories.  Furthermore, in
the countr.es which we are studying, interest  ceilings often varied
according to the category of loan.  Measuring the gap between interest
rate ceilings and the market-equilibrium rates is necessarily a very
subjective matter.  In practice most of the calculations which we report
are simply based on the gap between r* and treasury  bill rates, on the
assumption that this gap approximates the relevant average gap for bank
lending rates.  Only for measure 2 do we apply a judgment as to whether
the Dank leading ceilings were more or less constraining than the actual
rates for treasuxy bills"l.
(d)  Explicit indirect taxes.  We select only the most important of
these for our calculations; in practice this comes down to including
only Cote d'Ivoire's tax on bank interest receipts, the so-called TPS.
This tax  may be seen as a kind of sales tax on financial services
provided by banks.  An argument can certainly be made for including
financial services within the scope of a general sales tax (this point
is taken up in a later section).  However, interest receipts is not the
appropriate base for such a tax and the effective rates in Cote d'Ivoire
have beer.  far higher than those imposed on value added elsewhere in the
econorny.
Thus the overall tax calculation  may be written (in an obvious nota-
tion).
(R*  - 1%)*CURRENCY  +
(R*  - RRES)*RESERVES  +
(R* - RTB)*GOVTBORPOWING  +
(R*  - RTB  +  MARGIN)*NONCOVTBORROWING  +
INDIRECT TAXES
11 It is in the area of bank ceilings that our measures are on the weakest
data foundations.  This is  why we have nevertheless preferred to take a sim-
ple approach than to try to incorporate subjective elements.
10This expression can be evaluated for the stocks outstanding and the
interest rates relevant at any moment in time, and summed over time to
get annual averages.  The approach adopted here was to take end-year
stock figures and apply the implicit rates of tax in effect at end-year
to these stocks 1 2.
2.2.2 Tax rates: percent of what?
Unlike the analysis of tariffs, excises or income taxes, for example,
there are no conventional or generally accepted ways of expressing the
burden of financial sector taxes in a simple or summary way.  For
example, in the case of an import tariff, if our main interest is in the
effect on consumer prices, we will often use the statutory rate of
tariff, i.e. the tariff expressed as a percentage of the net price of
the good.  A sales tax is usually expressed in the same way.  Alterna-
tively, if we are interested in the structure of protection which local
producers receive from the tariff, we will carry out an "effective rate
of protection" calculation, effectively expressing the tariff as a per-
centage of the local  value added component of the locally produced good.
For other purposes, it may be of interest to compare the revenue from a
particular tax  with total government revenue or expenditure, or with
overall economic activity or national income.
The main problem in approaching the same question for financial sector
taxes is not only the fact that there is no statutory rate of tax, but
also the complication that most taxes may have their impact on suppliers
of funds, on users of funds, and on the providers of specific factor
services.
In practice we can report the taxes as a share of (a) the stock of
financial assets affected by the tax, (b) the flow of income from those
affected assets, or national income generally, or (c) government revenue
or expenditure.
For (a) we report percentages of M2.  The reader should bear in mind,
however, that (as shown in the model of Appendix 1) different taxes are
likely to affect borrowers and lenders differentially.  Furthermore, in
some countries a high proportion of the tax falls, at least in the first
12 Data sources are listed in the data appendix.  In a few cases interpola-
tions or extrapolations had to  be made from published data.
11instance, on currency holders as opposed to those holding banks depos-
its.  Expressing the taxes as a share of M2 is necessarily a very
summary indicator.
In order Ro express the taxes by analogy with income tax (approach (b)),
it would be appropriate to compute some measure of the flow of imputed
income from the holding of financial assets or more generally of the
flow of consumption services from financial intermediation in the econ-
omy.  In the absence of readily available statistics on the share of
financial intermediation services to GDP we confine ourselves to
representing the taxes as a share of GDP.  The reader may wish to assume
that the flow of financial intermediation  services represents approxi-
mately the same proportion of GDP in the countries being studied.
Data on government revenue is available for most of the sample period,
and extrapolations have been used for missing data.  Comparing the total
of implicit and explicit financial spctor taxes to the usual concept of
government revenue (i.e. approach (c)) gives an indication of the rela-
tive degree to which government relies on the financial sector for reve-
nue.  Note that, except in the case of the TPS in Cote d'Ivoire, all of
the financial taxes reported are implicit ones and therefore represent a
supplement to the quoted go.ernment revenue figures.
Since several of the sample countries have suffered from  very high rates
of inflation, a refinement must be introduced to the usual data on
inflation and GDP flows to avui, potentially serious distortions.  This
requires using instantaneous, or continuously compounded, rates of
'.nflation  and interest.  The matter is explained fully in Appendix 3.
2.2.3 A digression on different concepts of seignorage.
When a government facing  budgeLary problems resorts to printing money to
bridge a financing gap, this may be expected to add to inflation or eat
into foreign reserves.  It is worth distinguishing this cash  flow  which
the government obtains by using the printing press from the tax on the
holders of currency resulting from the reduction in its value caused by
inflation uncompensated hy any interest  payment.  The former is equal to
the actual increase in the stock of currency; the latter may be approxi-
mated by the product of the inflation rate and the initial stock of
currency (in which case it is often termed the inflation tax).
Actually, since a rapid increase in the stock of currency will often
result in a roughly proportional increase in the price level, the cash
12flow and the tax may often be approximately equal; but it is the tax
concept that is more relevant for our study, while the cash flow concept
is relevant for analysis of deficit financing and macroeconomic stabil-
ity.  Since both of these concepts are referred to as seignorage in the
literature, this section expands on the distinction with a view to
clarifying the matter.
The fundamental point to bear in mind is that she tax impact of printing
currency derives from governments'  monopoly on currency issue and their
use of that monopoly to generate revenue.  Provided the quantity of
currency is not expanded too rapidly, its usefulness, supported by legal
tender laws, ensures that it will remain in demand.  In all countries,
the average cost of maintaining the stock of paper currency is suffi-
ciently low (despite the  need to replace soiled bills) to make the issue
of currency a potentially profitable business.  With very few exceptions
nowadays, governments ensure that they benefit from this potential by
reserving the right to issue paper currency to themselves or to a
government-owned currency board or central bank.  The resulting profits
are known as seignorage.
Though it might appear that its capacity to generate seignorage is a
magical property of money, on closer inspection it becomes obvious that
the government, in collecting seignorage, is  merely behaving in the way
of any monopolist trying to capture part of the consumer surplus
inherent in the product by selling at a price above marginal cost.  As
with any monopolist, a social inefficiency results: people economize too
much on the holding of currency.  The socially efficient outcome would
prevail if currency bore interest at the a rate sufficiently high to
make the choice between the issue  of currency and of treasury bills a
matter of indifference for the government.  If currency were produced
under competitive market conditions, this is the rate of interest which
would emerge, i.e. the market-clearing rate for floating rate, very
small denomination perpetuities.  We term it the "efficient currency
rate of interest (ECR)".
If paying the ECR, the currency issuer is making zero profits at the
margin.  In a steady inflation environment, the ECR would presumably be
close to the rate of inflation, assuming that real interest rates  were
generally small.  Some authors have used the rate of inflation as an
estimate of the ECR for this reason.  On the other hand, in an environ-
ment where market-clearing real interest rates cannot be relied upon to
13be small, it seems likely that the ECR would be closer to existing
short-term market-clearing rates of interest, such as Treasury bill
rates or the curb-market rate on first-class corporate promissory notes.
Thus the tax element of seignorage arises from the gap between the ECR
and the actual rate of interest on currency - zero.  Instead of issuing
perpetuities at market rate, the government  has issued them at zero
interest using its monopoly power.  Even if there is no new issue of
currency in the current year, yet the holders of currency may, if real
interest rates are high, be taxed in this year by virtue of the contin-
ued failure to pay them interest.  This is the currency tax: the base is
the stock of currency and the rate of tax is the (unobserved) ECR.
To take another example, even if the rate of inflation is zero there is
a currency tax if the ECR is positive.  On the other hand, if the ECR
and the inflation rate are both zero, then there is no currency tax,
even if currency holdings are growing to meet the demands of a growing
economy.
The financing side of currency issue is different.  When the budget
deficit needs to be financed, one option is the issue of currency.  Once
again we see currency as a perpetuity, which can be used for financing
because of its inherent attractiveness (convenience  yield).  The rate of
interest  paid is zero,  which means that, in equilibrium, the real value
of currency holdings will be such that the marginal convenience yield is
rather high.  New issues by the government will quickly result in a fall
in the value of each unit of currency (rise in the general price level)
to restore the equilibrium real value of total currency holdings.  Note
that no compulsion need be involved in the issue of currency: the inter-
changeability of each currency note ensures the acceptance of new
issues.  It is not the recipient of the new currency that pays the
currency tax, but all of the holders of currency.  Furthermore, if there
is an increasing demand for currency, it may be the case (in  a country
with no inflation or a falling price level) that no currency tax exists
even in a year when new currency is being issued to meet the growing
demand.
The literature is not sufficiently clear on this distinction between the
currency tax and the financing aspect of currency issue.  That is
because most of the literature focuses on simple cases of steady infla-
tion and low real interest rates.  In such circumstances, the rate of
growth in currency may indeed  be approximated  by the rate of inflation,
14as may  the  ECR. Whenever  such  circumstances  prevail  the  three  calcula-
tions  come  to the  same  number. In  other  words,  under  such  circum-
stances,  the  growth  in currency  (cash  flow  or financing  effect),  would
approximately  equal  the  inflation  rate  times  the  currency  (inflation
tax),  or the  measure  used in this  paper  (currency  tax). Empirical
applications  in less  stable  environments  force  us to  be more  specific
and  precise  in  our  measurements.  Indeed,  the  difference  between  the
cash  flow  measure  of seignorage  and  our  evaluation  of the  currency  tax
was  as high  as several  percent  of GDP in  some  years  for  some  of the
countries  in  our  study.
While  most  empirical  studies  have  employed  the  cash flow  approach  to
measuring  seignorage,  and  are  thus  implicitly  focussing  on the  financing
aspect,  in the  present  context  the  fiscal  approach  is  clearly  the  rele-
vant  one.
153 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
3.1  Main observations
Though they remain somewhat speculative, the calculations which we have
made (Table 1) imply that financial sector taxation 1978-88 has averaged as
much as 4-7 per cent of GNP per annum in some African countries (Ghana,
Nigeria and Zambia), whereas it  has remained in the region of 2 per cent
for others (Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya) 1 3. This may be compared with total
-xplicit tax revenue varying be-ween about 10 and 25 per cent of GNP in
most countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  Expressed as a percentage of the
'3road  money stock M2, the tax rates are much higher, averaging over 30 per
cent in Ghana. 1 and reaching 90 per cent there ir.  1982.  Our estimates are
much higher than traditional cash-flow seignorage measures which come out
at around 1 per cent of GDP for all but Ghana, which had 3 per cent.
By any reckoning, the financial sector  has been very heavily taxed in
comparison with other sectors.  For instance, the average tax collected has
in all cases exceeded the value added of the banking system 1 5. Even
excluding the currency tax, which does not bear directly on the banking
system, the average tax collected has been a multiple of the value added of
the banking system in the three high-tax countries.  Apart from the taxa-
tion of export commodities and perhaps some luxury imports, it would be
hard to find a significant sector that is taxed as heavily in developing
countries.  Some caveats are in order.  For example a part of the tax  will
have been passed to depositors in the form of a reduction in the pure rate
of interest on savings, a part will have been borne by the consumers of
banking services.  Furthermore, an important point to bear in mind that in
some cases the magnitude of the inflation  may have come as a surprise: such
unanticipated taxes  may have involved lowar efficiency losses to the extent
that they did not induce the changes in  behavior which would have occurred
13 Except  where otherwise stated, all data refers to Measure 1.  Table 3
summarizes the results obtained with the other measures.  Althoujgh  the num-
bers are quite different, Ghana, Nigeria and Zambia remain the highest tax
countries for most years.
14 In Nigeria and Zambia the corresponding averages are 17 and 15 per cent,
with Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya averaging 8 and 5 per cent respectively.
15 Complete data on value added in the  banking system is not available, but
rough calculations indicate that (measured  at factor cost) it is unlikely to
exceed 1.5 Der cent of GDP under normal circumstances in any of our coun-
tries.
16if they had been anticipated.  Nevertheless, it is clear that this level of
taxation has, one way or another, provided a  very serious disincentive to
financial intermediation.
For each country there has been a considerable  year-to-year fluctuation in
the rate of  financial sector taxation (Table 1 and Figures 1 to 5).  These
fluctuations are correlated with fluctuations in the rate of inflation.
This is largely  because a high rate of inflation  would imply a high rate of
market-clearing nominal interest rates.  The rate of most implicit finan-
cial sector taxes and some explicit ones is linked to actual or estimated
market-clearing rates of nominal interest.
As elaborated below, episodes of interest rate or exchange rate liberaliza-
tion are not always associated with a reduction in all forms of financial
taxation notably because of the increase in inflation.
The implicit financial sector taxes  have been more heavily used when the
system of regular taxes is insufficient to achieve a fiscal balance - often
because government expenditure has been expanded in line  with a transitory
boost in receipts arising from an export boom.  When such a fiscal crisis
occurs, implicit taxes on the financial system bear, almost by definition
of a fiscal crisis, most of the burden of the budget gap' 6. This explains
the high variance of the effective rates and their unpredictability.
Some authors' 7 have argued that optimal tax policy would result in seigno-
rage and other financial sector taxes  being high when other taxes are high
and low when the others are low.  But because financial taxes seem to be
used in times of fiscal crisis, and not in an optimally pre-planned manner,
this theoretical pattern does not correspond to the African experience' 8.
Countries which have maintained price and exchange rate stability over a
long period have not employed onerous financial sector taxes.  Even the
high rates of explicit taxation on the financial system in Cote d'Ivoire
have not been comparable in magnitude to the implicit taxes employed else-
where.
16 Cf. the finding of Kiguel and Neumeyer (1989) for Argentina.
17 Obstfeld (1989) provides references.
18 However, there is a positive correlation  between the different components
of financial sector taxation in each country.
17It is not evident from the data that there is a substantial sensitivity of
money holdings to short-term fluctuations in the return on monetary assets,
but persistent distortions, such as prevailed in Ghana before 1983, have
had a significant impact"9. It may be that the biggest impact of taxes on
money holdings is only felt if the tax is maintained for several years.
3.2 The role of commodity and fiscal cycles.
Reviewing the evidence frorma  our sample of sub-Saharan  African countries
during the 1980s, and in some cases the 1970s, a  distinctive pattern
emerges.  In particular, the overall policy with regard to the stability of
the currency, and specifically exchange rate policy, is an important deter-
minant of the degree to which countries have had recourse to financial
sector taxation.  Such recourse tends to be greatest after the collapse of
a commodity price boom.
The lowest in idence of financial sector taxation in the sample is in  Kenya
ancl  Cote d'Iv ire.  Cote  d'Ivoire's  fixed exchange rate policy for forty
years has 1im ted the divergence of its inflation rate from that of Fran-
ce 20. Withou  high inflation the usual mechanisms for obtaining revenue:
the currency tax,  nominal interest rate ceilings far below market-clearing
levels and onerous reserve requirements,  were not easily available to Cote
d'Ivoire 2l.  As with the other countries, Cote d'Ivoire responded to export
commodity pri4e booms by expanding the program of public expenditure.  As
elsewhere, public expenditure wa  slow to return to sustainable levels when
the boom ran put.  However, Cote d'Ivoire managed to finance some of its
excessive exp nditure (and the resulting current account balance of pay-
ments deficit  through foreign borrowing, including borrowing from the
regional Cent al bank 22.
19 The question of shifting demand for money in Ghana is addressed in  Appen-
dix 2.  The apparent failure of money balances to respond to opportunity cost
in Nigeria and Zambia is evident from Appendix Figure A6.
20 Cf. Appendix Figure A4, also Honohan (1990a).
21 Much the same story can be told of Cameroon, originally envisaged as part
of the sample, but dropped from our sample because its experience paralleled
Cote d'Ivoire in most important respects.
22 The effect of these borrowings on regional credit expansion tended to be
Dartly offset by surpluses in other members of the currency union, see Hono-
han (1990b).
18It is not surprising that, with implicit financial taxes limited by the
effects of exchange rate policy, Cote d'Ivoire turned to explicit 'ndirect
taxes, notably the TPS on bank interest receipta, to support revenue.  But
the comparatively modest yield of TPS only serves to emphasize the limited
revenue potential of explicit taxes by comparison with implicit taxes.  On
average, the  TPS has raised about one-half of the financial sector taxation
in Cote d'Ivoire.
Nigeria, Ghana and Zambia also maintained fixed or slowly moving exchange
rates during much of the period under review.  However the situation was
very different here.  The fixed exchange rates were applicable only to a
fraction of international transactions, chiefly exports.  Allocations of
foreign exchange for imports at the official exchange rate were very lim-
ited.  Hence, most imports were purchased with foreign exchange acquired at
an informal parallel market exchange rate greatly depreciated with respect
to the official rate.  In Ghana and Zambia the operation of false official
exchange rates had the effect of taxing non-government exporters  by not
allowing them to obtain the true local currency value of their exports 23.
The true marginal cost of foreign exchange for these three  countries was
far less stable than the official rate, and domestic inflation,  which was
very rapid during certain periods, reflected this discrepancy.  For exam-
ple, quarterly inflation in  Nigeria approached an annualized rate of 50 per
cent during 1983, a year during which official exchange rate depreciation
was in single figures (cf.  Appendix Figure Al).  In 1983 inflation in Ghana
was almost 150%.
Th,;e high inflation rates combined with severely controlled interest rates
allowed the governmen  to generate significant implicit revenues from the
financial system.  Th:' generally applied in the downswing of a commodity
boom.  The main episodes to which this clearly applied are the  Nigerian
inflationary surge of 1982-3, the Zamblan of 1915-76 and the Ghanaian of
1981-82.
The decline in  Nigerian  oil  revenues during 1981-83 was at first
partly absorbed by a considerable expansion in the fiscal deficit dur-
ing 1981 and 1982 (cf.  Appendix Figure A5) 24. For instance, imports
continued to grow rapidly during 1982 despite the sl-irp  fall in export
23 In Nigeria, the state-owned oil company was the main entity paying this
tax, indeed the net effect of the arrangements was to provide a subsidy to
the private sector, specifically the  banks, through the allocations - limited
though they were - of foreign exchange at the official rate.
24 There is an interesting account of the dependence of Nigeria's budget on
the petroleum business in Gelb (1989).
19receipts.  This large fiscal deficit was at first funded at the Cen-
tral Bank with comparatively little pressure on the domestic banking
system.  There was a corresponding drawdown of foreign reserves, but
by early 1983 90 per cent of the reserves of just two years before had
been eroded.  Government turned to the domestic banking system in a
large way.  Inflation accelerated dramatically.  The total financial
taxes as a share of GNP at end-1982 and end-1983 were computed at
about 8 per cent of GNP.
The main episode of taxation of the finanicial  s"stem before 1985 in
Zambia occurred in 1975-1977.  As i'ith  previous booms in 1966 and
1969-70, the soaring price of copper in 1973-74 induced an expansion
in government expenditure which was not scaled down until 1978.  The
resulting deficit, which reached 20 percent of GDP, was financed
mostly by borrowing from commercial banks and from the Central Bank,
the latter fuelling inflation (the  monetary base increased  by 50 per-
cent in 1975).  Total financial taxes jumped to aFout 7 per cent of
GDP.
The dynamics underlying the rapid high inflation in Ghana in 1982-83
are a little more complex.  This was, after all, only the final epi-
sode in a story of economic collapse which extended over several
years.  Here too there  was, just before the acceleration of inflation,
a decline in export receipts, due partly to increased smuggling in the
face of a declining producer price offered for cocoa by the state
marketing board, and partly to a disastrous harvest.  But there was
also a progressive loss of confidence in money (cf.  Appendix Figure
A3) culminating in the so-called currency "reforms" in  which large
cash holdings were partially demonetized.  Although currency in circu-
lation expanded by 75% during 1981, the last stages in the Ghanaian
inflation were driven as much by a flight from money as by the
increases in the stock of currencv or of credit going to government.
At end-1982 we computed total finaLLcial  taxation running at 13 per
cent of GNP (or ovex 90 per cent of M2), about one-half of this  being
attributable to the currency tax.
Kenya provides an intermediate case.  The exchange rate was not fixed
rigidly as in Cote d'Ivoire, but access to foreign exchange was consider-
ably freer than in  Nigeria, Zambia and Ghana in the early 1980s.  Inflation
did not reach the levels experienced in the other three countries -
quarterly inflation never exceeded an anniualized  rate of 25 per cent during
the 1980s.  Nor were interest rates  held as low as elsewhere.  Neverthe-
less, for Kenya too  t is possible to discern an commodity-fiscal-inflation
tax cycle.
The end of the 1976 coffee boom was followed  by further terms of trade
shocks in 1979-80 resulting in a serious  budget deficit largely
financed by borrowing from the Central Bank of Kenva  (cf. Appendix
Figure A2).  The resulting monetary expansion was accompanied by an
acceleration of inflation to about 20 percent in 1982.  Totc'l  finan-
cial taxation in this period averaged about 3 per cent of GNP - twice
the average for 1977-88.  A subsequent successful stabilization  was
derailed by a new coffee boom in 1986.  Government expenditure was
increased drastically, and, although the resulting deficit could be
financed in 1986 without placing pressure on external reserves, it
resulted in a balance of payments crisis in 1987 when coffee prices
20fell.  Once again, monetary financing resulted in a modest pick- p of
Inflation, even though the monetary impact of the deficit was limited
by higher holdings of reserses by the banks.  Total financial taxation
did not increase substantially in this second episode, notably because
lending rate ceilings were no longer binding.
3.3 Economic reforms and financial taxation.
Fiscal stabilization  programs have clearly been associated with reduced
reliance on financial sector taxation in the countries  which we have
examined.  However, the same cannot unambiguously be said for measures of
structural reform and liberalization.  Nigeria, Ghana and Zambia have
undertaken relevant structural reforms which went beyond fiscal retrench-
ment to include a far-reaching liberalization of the exchange rate as well
as at least some liberalization of interest rates.
Though the reforms were implemented over time, the main rationalization of
the exchange markets can be dated fairly  precisely.  Thus in Ghana the
multiplication of the official price of foreign exchange by a factor of 11
occurred on October 12, 1983,  providing perhaps the clearest signal of the
government's change of heart with regard to economic policy.  Likewise the
introduction of the  Kwacha foreign exchange auction on October 4, 1985
(which quickly had the effect of almost tripling the local price of foreign
exchange), combined with substantial increases in interest rates, marked
the beginning of Zambia's eighteen month experiment  with liberalization.
The introduction of a twoltier foreign exchange market in  Nigeria on Sep-
tember 29, 1986 (also increasing the price of foreign exchange by a factor
of about three) was an important step in the Nigerian reforms.
But examination of the data does not suggest that these reforms coincided
with a reduction in all forms of financial sector taxation.  For example,
although Zambian inflation  had already picked up during 1985 (reflecting
the effects of a slump in copper output on the fiscal position), the effec-
tive devaluation of the currency resulted in a further surge (prices rose
25 per cent in one quarter - see Appendix Figure Al) 25. Thereafter
inflation subsided, but the surge had added to the currency tax.  The
liberalization of interest rates reduced the implicit tax through interest
rate ceilings, but added to pressure on the budget, which was partly eased
through the increased financing provided through successive increases in
25 Pinto (1988)  has explained the  phenomenon whereby a devaluation of the
official exchange rate may weaken the parallel rate too, thereby contributing
to inflation even where most imports are paid for through the parallel mar-
ket.
21banks'  reserve  requirements 26. Thus  the  liberalization  actually  contrib-
uted to an increase  in  some  components  of financial  taxation,  at least  in
its  early  stages. However,  the  abandonment  of the  reforms  in  early  1987,
accompanied  by the  reimposition  of interest  rate  ceilings  and  a worsening
of inflation  as government  expenditure  increased  once  more,  led  to  much
higher  rates  of financial  sector  taxation  - reaching  ovet  18  per  cent  of
CDP  at end-1988,  or some  60  per  cent  of  M2.
In  Nigeria  too,  the  reforms  of 1986,  coinciding  as they  did  with a  weaken-
ing  price  of oil,  were followed  by a sharp  acceleration  of inflation  (cf
Appendix  Figure  Al). As interest  rates  remained  low in  nominal  terms,
presumably  influenced  by moral  suasion,  implicit  taxation  of the  financial
sector  soared  to  record  levels  - over  8  per  cent  of GDP  at end-1987.
In  Ghana,  a gradual  return  of  confidence  has increased  the  base of finan-
cial  sector  taxation  since  the  reform  (Appendix  Figures  A2 and  A3),  but the
tax  rates  have  remained  comparatively  modest  - less  than  one-seventh  of
their  peak levels.
3.4  Crowding  out.
One  of the  largest  components  of implicit  financial  sector  taxation,  as
measured  here,  is the  earmarked  tax  coming  from  interest  rate  ceilings. In
those  countries  where  most  of the  banking  system's  assets  represent  claims
on non-government  borrowers,  the  benefit  of this  tax  is transferred
directly  to these  borrowers. It is  worth  noting,  therefore,  that  in  each
of the  countries  in  our  sample,  the  government's  share  in  total  domestic
credit  has shown  a secular  growth. Each  of the  governments  hava thus  not
only increased  financial  sector  taxation  at times  of crisis,  but  they  have
progressively  increased  the  proportion  of those  taxes  which  do not  simply
return  to  non-government  borrowers.
The  most  conspicuous  example  of this  crowding  out is  Ghana. 'nf  the  early
1970s,  non-government  credit  occasionally  exceeded  that  to government.
Thereafter,  however,  the  government  took  an ever  larger  share. After  1977,
the  decline  in real  monetary  holdings  seriously  limited  the  government's
ability  to generate  financing  through  this  route  and real  credit,  both
government  and  non-government,  fell  until  the  reforms  of 1983. Since  then
real  money  demand  has recovered  somewhat  (though  remaining  far  below  the
26 Because  these  developments  were so  varied  during  a short  period  of time,
not  all  of these  phases  can  be clearly  seen in  the  end-year  data  of Table  1.
22levels  achieved  ir the  mid-1970s),  but  government  has  continued  to take
most of the  credit  available. (Government  credit  was  about  six  times  as
large  as  non-government  towards  the  end  of the  period  under  review.
In Cote  d'Ivolre,  the  jump in  credit  to the  government  in the  period
1979-83  represents  the  major  recourse  of government  to the  financial  sys-
tem. Because  Cote  d'Ivoire  has  access  to the  regional  Central  bank,  this
increase  was  possible  despite  no sharp  reduction  in  real  non-government
credit  and  despite  a fall  in  real  money  holdings.
234 EFFICIENCY COSTS
The quest,on of the efficiency costs of fi.sancial  sector taxation has proved
a  very  controversial matter in the literature.  Some authors have argued that
the financial sector should remain wholly untaxed on grounds of economic
efficiency (cf.  Kimbrough, 1989).  The argument is that financial intermedi-
ation provides services that are more analogous to intermediate goods in pro-
duction rather than final consumption goods.  A standard tax efficiency
argument, going back to the classic papers by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971),
states that no tax distortions affecting production decisions are desirable
when a full range of consumption taxes are available; the economy should pro-
duce on the productioa frontier,  with needed tax revenue being obtained
through influencing the choice of consumption  bundle along that frontier.
But are financial intermediation services only part of the production pro-
cess, or do they ente- directly into consumpcion 27?  Models of money ant'
banking which assume that money contributes directly to consumption value or
those  which rely on the assumption that money holdings are motivated by a
"'cash-in-advance"  requirement for consumption 28 are among those  which imply
that at least some financial services should  be taxed in an efficient tax
regime.  Furthermore, in developing countries, the government's ability to
tax consumption efficiently is somewhat limited, imDlving that some deviation
from the ideal of no production distortions may prove necessary.
A different argument against taxing the financial sector is that such taxa-
tion discriminates against productive investment.  If so, and if investment
is already below  the social optimum for other reasons (for  example because of
increasing returns to investment), this would be an argument for limiting the
contribution of  the financial sector to budget revenue.  However, such an
argument requires establishing that the supposed discrimination actually
occurs.
27 The relevance of this question is explored in Chamley (1985).
28 Theoreticians have employed the cash-in-advance approach to model formally
the holding of money for transactions purposes (cf  Englund, 1989, Englund and
Svensson, 1988).  Basically they assume that purchases cannot be made by an
economic agent during a certain period of time unless she has a sufficient
cash balance at the beginning of that period.  This transactions constraint
thus motivates the holding of cash balances.  By employing such models it is
possible to compute the utility derived from cash balances.
24This section makes no attempt to resolve these efficiency issues.  Our pur-
pose is instead to  highlight the fact that different forms of financial sec-
tor taxation may have quite different efficiency implications.  Section 4.1
reviews some of the effects based mainly on the formal model of Appendix 1.
Section 4.2 looks at some practical issues .)f  design in improving financial
sector taxation.
4.1 Efficiency impact of different financial sector taxes
While collecting revenue for the government, the taxes and quasi-taxes
which are being examined here also distort economic decisions and probably
result in deadweight welfare losses.  Thus, to take the best-known example
- the currency tax, not only does the existence of high inflation imply a
quasi-tax revenue to the government from the private sector's holding of
currency balances but, as already  mentioned, there is an additional dead-
weight or efficiency loss to society  because of the degree to which the
private sector responds to this tax  by unnecessarily economizing on
currency holdings.
Different types of financial sector tax influence  different marginal costs
and benefits and cause different incentive distortions.  The simplest way
of thinking about the efficiency costs of quasi-fiscal distortions to bank-
ing  would be to consider a certainty framework  where banks simply channel
all deposits to borrowers for investment.  The equilibrium rate of return
would be represented at the intersection of the supply curve of deposits
(depending  on depositors' alternative uses for funds 29) and the demand
curve for loans (depending on the marginal productivity of investment).  In
such a simple model, any tax collected from the process would be equivalent
and could be considered as a tax on loans or on deposits; the efficiency
costs of such a tax could be estimated by a Harberger triangle at the
intersection of supply and demand in a standard manner, with the marginal
efficiency cost about twice the average cost.
29 A caveat on the supply of deposits is in order:  As Shaw pointed out many
years ago, a consequence of credit market imperfections is that the purchase
of investment goods (or  any bulky item such as durables) requires the accumu-
lation of cash balances prior to the purchase of the good.  This cash-in-
advance demand for money may actually increase in  high inflation
circumstances.  This could be part of the explanation for our failure to
observe any clear negative relation between inflation  and the level of money
balances in countries such as Nigeria or Zambia.  (When the inflation rate
reaches  very high level such as in Ghana, its tax burden exceeds the cost of
substituting other assets for mor,ey,  and the velocity rises.)  In this case
the Harberger measurement would underestimate the efficiency cost of taxa-
tion.
25Such an analysis needs to be expanded to deal with the various distortions
that are inherent in banking and other financial markets faced  with imper-
fect and asymmetric information.  For one thing, banks spend real resources
in assessing the viability of borrowers' proprsals and in monitoring the
performance of borrowers.
The fact that such monitoring is costly may mean that fixed interest loan
contracts are in many circumstances the  best way of coping with potential
incentive problems that may arise.  This may partially explain why most
bank loans are made on a fixed interest  basis (cf  Diamond, 1984).  The
drawback of this type of financial instrument is that all the windfall
gains of an investment are captured by the investor,  whereas the  bank cares
only about the probability that the return covers the loan payment and the
distribution of return  when the return falls short of the payment due.  One
can show that in this context the marginal productivity of loans is greater
than the lending rate.  Thus the fixed-interest contract drives a wedge
between the social returns on investment  projects and the bank's incentive
to lend to support them.  When account is taken of these weaknesses of the
risk-sharing arrangements inherent in the fixed interest loan contract it
becomes clear that there  may therefore  be a residual distortion or ineffi-
ciency even when the interest rate equilibrates the loan market.
The fact that the loan market may already be distorted before any govern-
ment intervention is considered has implications for the likely magnitude
of the deadweight or efficiency costs imposed  by taxes.  Simple partial
equilibrium models of the deadweight costs of taxation imply that, while a
small tax imposed on an undistorted market generates only a small dead-
weight loss, the same small tax imposed on an already distorted market can
result in quite severe deadweight losses.  Therefore these information  and
contract design problems are important in  judging the relative efficiency
of different forms of financial sector taxation.
In order to cast some light on these issues,  we refer again to Appendix 1,
which outlines a simple model of a controlled and taxed  banking system
reflecting some of the features of the African economies which are being
studied.  In particular, as already mentioned, the model includes an
explicit treatment of reserve requirements  and lending rate ceilings.  It
also models the type of risk-free instrument  which has typically been
available in most of these countries,  namely a government bill whose inter-
est rate is set by the authorities at a level which may be sufficient to
26attract voluntary holdings by the banking system.  The model assumes an
uncontrolled deposit interest rate, corresponding to the actual situation
in several of the countries.
The model give special attention to the role of banks as assessors of the
quality of loan applications 30. We assume that the banks have the ability
to screen loan proposals and thereby acquire more precise information about
the likely success of the loan than is generally available.  This screening
is costly, and the  banks will only undertake it to the extent that it
contributes to their profitability.  Because of the imperfect  nature of
fixed interest contracts discussed above, the banks do not have the incen-
tive to make the socially optimal amount of lending, or of screening for
lending.  That is so even in the absence of taxes or controls; any
additional disincentive coming from policy - even a small additional dis-
tortion will have significant welfare costs.
For this reason those taxes which induces the banks to shift away from
lending (and into risk-free go4ernment  bills, for example) are likely to
have the greater welfare costs.  According to the model, ceilings on bank
lending rates are the worst from this point of view: they reduce the return
on lending activities and so reduce:  lending and loan-screening by banks.
In contrast, measures such as reserve requirements, taxes on bank interest
receipts and changes in the rate of|  interest on government bills do not
reduce lending.  (They do influence'  deposit interest rates 31 and hence the
total volume of resources intermediated  by the banking system 32, but this
results in a reductiun in  banks' holdings of government bills rather than
in their lending 33).
30 This emphasis on ex ante credit appraisal coincides with the  views of Fama
(1985) as to what is the key distinguishing feature of banks.  A slightly
different perspective is adopted by Diamond (1984),  who sees the  banks as
being uniquely qualified to monitor the performance of borrowers ex post.
Other authors have emphasized the liquidity creation function of banks (and
have therefore been interested in  bank runs and crises, cf. Diamond and Dyb-
vig, 1983), or in the provision of transactions services, cf. Englund (1989),
Englund and Svensson (1990).
31 The Appendix gives a number of formulas for the impact of reserve require-
ments and other taxes on deposit interest rates.
32 This refers to the case where government  bill interest rates are being
1.eld  voluntarily by the banks.  The Appendix also discusses the  more compli-
cated case where no government bills are voluntarily held.
33 This result derives from the fact that the banks face diminishing returns
on their loan portfolio due to the cost of screening; in contrast the return
on government bills is fixed.  Therefore new deposits are, at the margin,
placed in government bills.
27The conclusion, unquantified and tentative though it must be 34,  is that the
deadweight loss from the introduction of lending rate ceilings may be sig-
nificantly higher - for equivalent revenue - than that from reserve
requirements or the inflation tax 35. It is therefore worth noting interest
ceilings on non-government lending are very important quantitatively.  They
accounted for one-third of the total of taxes and quasi-taxes in Kenya,
Nigeria and Zambia, and between 15 and 20 per cent for the other two.
4.2 Criteria for better financial.  sector taxation.
The high variability of the effective rate of financial sector taxation, as
illustrated by the data from African co-untries,  is largely attributable to
the fact that both implicit  and explicit financial sector tax rates are not
invariant to the price level or the rate of inflation.  An ideal tax
34 Our model does not, for example, expliciLly consider the impact of moral
hazard and adverse selection on interest rates, a topic  which have been
widely discussed in recent years following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  Highler
interest rates will generally convert some potentially viable projects into
non-viable ones; furthermore  borrowers may shift in favor of riskier behavior
if interest rates are higher.  For both these reasons the average effective
rate of return to banks on loans (net of default) does not increase as fast
as the contractual rate.  Thare may be a value of the contractual rate such
that the average effective rate reaches a maximum.  No bank will lend at a
rate higher than this  value.  This implies that the observed schedule between
the lending rate and the level of loans is subject to a ceiling.  However,
note that this ceiling is  put in place by private markets; although it may
mean that government intervention tu place a ceiling on lending rates is less
constraining than it appears to be, it does tnot  mean that binding interest
ceilings have lower marginal efficiency costs.
Another welfare aspect of interest ceilings which has not been considered in
the model relates to the tendency of governments to use financial sector tax-
ation at tires of fiscal crisis.  Because of the fear that this will happen
again, agents are reluctant to expose themselves to financial sector taxation
by, for example, having large currency holdings (Ghana is the best example of
this withdrawal of the private sector from the financial system as a result
not only of high inflation  but of the confiscatory nature of the currency
reforms).  Such precautionary behavior effectively increases the equilibrium
interest rate for domestic government borrowing, as the private sector hedges
against government recourse to the inflation tax (especially  as, because of
time inconsistency, the government can not normally precommit itself to a
non-inflationary policy).  These higher interest rates will result in other
taxes being imposed to cover the interest costs, and it is possible that the
efficiency costs of these taxes could be greater than the distortions caused
by the imposition of an interest ceiling.  Accordingly, there might be off-
setting welfire gains to the usual losses from an interest rate ceiling
imposed in ;.ch  circumstances.
35 There is also the point that, to the extent that not all of the borrowers
who benefit from the low interest rate were intended beneficiaries of the
policy, there is an unintended redistribution involved in  having interest
rates ceilings.
28structure would achieve such invariance or "super-neutrality".  This cannot
be fully achieved in regard to currency,  but it could at least  be accom-
plished for the banking system by eliminating interest rate ceilings or at
least varying them in line  with inflation rates, by paying variable
interest rates on reserve requirements and by avoiding taxes based on nomi-
nal interest receipts of banks.  Furthermore, in order to limit distortions
affecting the competitiveness of the banking system the appropriate base
for indirect taxation of the  banking system is the value added of the
banking system.  These points are elaborated in this section.
4.2.1 The typical financial sector quasi-tax is sensitive to the rate of
inflation.
Most tax systems are not invariant to the rate of inflation or even to
the level of prices.  A stable tax structure  would raise the same real
resources at all price levels and at all rates of inflation.  A value-
added tax, for example, will do this.  An excise fixed as a number of
units of local currency per tonne will not; at a  higher nominal price
level, this tax will raise less in real terms.  A progressive income
tax, with the bands fixed in nominal terms,  will raise more real revenue
at a  higher nominal price level. We can call a tax which raises the same
real resources at different price  levels  an indexed tax.  A tax  which
raises the same real resources regardless of the rate  of  inflation  is  a
super-indexed tax.
Not all indexed taxes are super-indexed.  For instance, a tax on inter-
est receipts of a bank at a fixed percentage rate may be indexed.  If
the price level is rising at a steady rate, the nominal value of the
ba.nk's  loans will tend to grow at the same rate.  With the constant
J.nflation  rate, there is no reason to suppose that the nominal interest
rate will change.  Thus the revenue from this tax will also grow at the
rate of inflation, and will therefore  be constant in real terms.  This
kind of tax is indexed.  But now consider the revenue from the same tax,
at a higher. but still constant, rate of inflation.  Again the real
revenue is constant, but it  has a different - higher - real value than
it  had at the lower rate of inflation to the extent that the nominal
rate of interest has increased to compensate for the higher rate of
inflation.  The tax is not super-indexed.
29Most financial taxes, linked as they are to nominal interest rates, are
not super-indexed.  This applies to the currency tax, reserve require-
ments tax and the impact of nominal interest rate ceilings, for example.
It means that their impact can be dramatically different at different
rates of inflation and nominal interest rates.  In some cases, espe-
cially with nominal interest rate ceilings, but also with reserve
requirements tax, the tax goes up more than in proportion to the nominal
interest rate.  It is this feature which forges the link between fiscal
crises and financial sector taxation.
Since the currency tax is inherently  not super-indexed, there is a
second-best argument 36 that taxes that affect bank deposits should also
be sensitive to the rate of inflation.  However, the diminishing rela-
tive importance of currency in  monetary holdings implies that this argu-
ment is becoming progressively  weaker over time.  In general it seems
desirable to move in the direction of super-indexed taxes.  Short of
full interest liberalization, such super-indexation could be helped by
linking administered interest rates to some key rate which was adjusted
in a flexible manner in response to market pressures, or at least to
changes in expected inflation.  This would tend to stabilize the
implicit tax revenue from reserve requirements  and from bank lending
rate ceilings.  So far as explicit taxes are concerned, the merits of
the VAT could be considered in this context.
4.2.2 VAT on the Financial System.
One favored approach to the rationalization  of indirect taxation in the
economy in general is to tax final consumption expenditure at an uniform
rate.  Administratively the  most effective way of doing this is to  move
to value added as the base for taxation.  The application of VAT to  the
financial sector has been a controversial issue in industrial coun-
tries 3 7,  especially because the sophistication  of industrial country
financial markets makes it quite all to easy for avoidance techniques in
respect of any financial sector tax.  As  a result, the financial sector
36 This argument is fully discussed by Englund, 1989.  See also Brock, 1989
who quantifies the issue for developing countries.
37 Hoffman, Poddar and  Whalley (1987) and Mintz (1989) are interesting
recent contributions which clarify  many of the issues involved in applying
VAT to  banking services.  See also Gillis (1987).
30has been largely exempted from VAT in industrial countries.  For devel-
oping countries which already tax their financial systems in a distort-
ing manner, it is arguable that a move to value-added would represent an
improvement.  In particular, by removing pure interest flows from the
scope of tax, such a move would reduce the bias in favor of curb credit
markets.  Furthermore, a properly designed VAT on banking would be
super-neutral.  It is important to define carefully what is meant by
value added in the banking system in order to achieve the hoped-for
efficiency gains.
Value added in the banking system is generally calculated by reference
to the difference between gross receipts on the one hand, and the sum of
interest and intermediate goods expenses on the other.  Thus, a stylized
operating account of an African commercial bank might look like this
(based  on published figures for the largest bank in Cote d'Ivoire in
1986):
Income:  Expenditure:
Interest  35  Interest  18




Profit before tax  3
Total  40  Total  40
A standard definition of the contribution of the banking system to the
total value of 40 is the contribution of the primary factors of produc-
tion employed by the banking system.  Borrowed funds are not a primary
factor of production, so that the interest  which the bank pays on its
borrowings must be subtracted from the 40.  Intermediate consumption
represents a portion of the  value of banking output which is contributed
indirectly  by other industries,  whose output has been used by the bank-
ing industry; this too must therefore  be subtracted from the 40.  Provi-
sions for  bad or doubtful debts must also be subtracted; the purpose of
these provisions is to offset a potential overstatement of receipts.
(To the extent that the bad debts for which provision had not been made
were not realized in the longer term, this would depress the item "in-
terest, etc." in subsequent years).  Depreciation represents a bringing
31to current  account  of  an appropriate  proportion  of future  replacement
expenditures;  to the  extent  that  these  will  be expenditures  on interme-
diate  consumption,  this  too  must  be subtracted.  We are  left  with the
final  two  items,  representing  profits  before  tax  and  other  expenses,
primarily  payroll  expenses,  to  wit  the  payment  to the  factor  of  produc-
tion  labor. A rough  estimate  of the  value  added  of the  bank  would
therefore  be 11.
Note that  in  this  presentation  the  bank's  interest  (and  other)  receipts
can  be seen  as composed  of two  elements:  first,  a pure interest  element
passed  through  to  the  depositor  and  second,  an element  to cover  the  cost
of the  intermediation  services  provided  by the  bank. While  a comprehen-
sive  expenditure  tax,  such  as a  value  added  tax,  would  not  consider  the
pure  interest  component  as taxable,  there  is  no good  reason  for
excluding  the  intermediation  services  in  a comprehensive  VAT,  and  apply-
ing  the  general  rate  of VAT  to them. The  definition  presented  here
would  be perfectly  appropriate  in this  context.
Note  that  a comprehensive  VAT  would  allow  VAT  paid  by banks  as a  credit
against  the  VAT due  from  producers  within  the  VAT  net  to the  extent  that
it is  producers  that  buy  banking  services. This  creates  an important
practical  difficulty  in identifying  how  much  of bank's  value  added  is
attributable  to services  provided  to  particular  customers. This is  an
illustration  of the  administrative  problems  which  can  arise,  and  which
have led industrial countries to exempt banking services from VAT: after
all, the banking services provided to producers within the VAT net will
effectively be subject to VAT at the next point of sale 38. Only those
banking services which are provided directly to consumers or to non-VAT
registered producers will escape.  This, however, is potentially a seri-
ous drawback in the context of countries  whose tax regime is far from
comprehensive, as is  the case in most of Africa.
While the introduction of a comprehensive  VAT on financial services may
pose difficult administrative problems, and while it should be noted
that application of the general rate of VAT to financial services would
raise only a small fraction of the revenue derived at present from
implicit taxes, nevertheless our approach suggests that whatever regime
of indirect taxation is imposed on the banking system should be designed
with the model of VAT as an ideal reference point.
38 Furthermore, the value-added of producers suDplying inputs to banks will
effectively be subject to a double tax since the VAT paid by the suppliers
will form part of the charge made by the bank to its customers, while the
customers will not receive a credit for it.
325 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have measured the distorting taxation on the financial sec-
tor of five African countries.  Our method has taken a broader concept of
taxation than is customary, going beyond the currency tax and reserve
requirements to include the quasi-tax effects of interest  rate ceilings.
This broader approach reveals the true scale of financial sector taxation to
be very much higher than is commonly appreciated.  Though the level of taxa-
tion has varied widely over time and between countries, it has been a very
significant element in total government revenue, especially at times of
fiscal crisis induced by commodity slumps.  On average over the decade
1978-88 this taxation collected between 4 and 7 per cent of GDP in three
economies exhibiting less macroeconomic stability (Ghana,  Nigeria and Zam-
bia), and in the region of 2 per cent of GDP for the two more stable econo-
mies in the sample (Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya).  Expressed as a percentage of
M2, the rate of tax has gone as high as 90 per cent.
By any reckoning, the financial sector has been very heavily taxed in compar-
ison with other sectors.  Even excluding the currency tax, which does not
bear directly on the banking system, the average tax collected has been a
multiple of the value added of the banking system in the three  high-tax coun-
tries.  Apart from the taxation of export commodities and perhaps some luxury
imports, it would be hard to find a significant sector that is taxed as
heavily in developing countries.  Such a level of taxation is a very serious
disincentive to financial intermediation  and is surely too high for economic
efficiency.
Different types of financial sector taxation have different distorting
effects on behavior.  Some forms may reduce the rate of interest to depos-
itors, discouraging financial saving; other forms may lead  banks to choose
riskfree government securities rather than  making the effort to screen
potential lending opportunities.  Because built-in microeconomic inefficien-
cies already reduce bank lending to non-government borrowers below the opti-
mal level, it is especially desirable to avoid any further reduction in such
lending.  Pursuing this line of reasoning, our theoretical analysis suggests
that, in relatively less developed financial  markets such as those of our
sample countries, interest rate ceilings may impose greater welfare costs for
equivalent revenue than other forms of taxation such as explicit indirect
taxes or reserve reuqirements.
33Surges  in inflation  in the  sample  countries  have  been correlated  with  high
financial  sector  taxation. What  has often  happened  is  that,  under  pressure
of an expanding  budget  deficit,  governments  have  turned  to Inflationary
financing. Although  we do  not  consider  the  broader  questions  of policy  '.on-
sistency  that  this  potential  for  inflationary  financing  entails,  we suggest
that  governments  should  consider  the  merits  of making  revenue  less  sensitive
to the  rate  of inflation.  This  would  require  a more  flexible  approach  to  the
determination  of interest  rates,  to ensure  that  administered  rates  do not
fall  far  below  market-clearing  levels. So far  as explicit  taxes  are  con-
cerned,  the  burden  of a  VAT-type  of tax  would  be much  less  sensitive  to the
rate  of inflation  than  taxes  based  on gross  interest  receipts  of banks.
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36Data Sources
Inflation: consumer  price index (4th  quarter average:  IFS, line  64).  CPI
for 1989 are World Bank staff estimates
Bank reserves: IFS, line 14-14a (14-14a-14e  for Ghana).
Currency outside banks: IFS, line 14a.
Government loans: IFS, line 22a.
Non-government  loans:  IFS,  lines  22a+22d+22f  for Cote  d'Ivoire  and
Nigeria, 22c+22d for  Ghana, 22a+22d for Zambia, and 22a+22b+22c+22d+22f
for Kenya.
GDP: IFS, line 99b.  For late  years World Bank staff estimates are used
(1987  Cote  d'Ivoire,  1988  Ghana  and  Cote  d'Ivoire,  19'  all  five
countries).
M2: IFS, line 34+35.
International Interest Rate: LIBOR US$, IFS line 60ldd.
Exchange Rate: IFS, line ae for Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya and line ag for
Ghana, Nigeria, and Zambia.
Treasury bill  rate: IFS,  line 60c  (4th quarter  average).  This was
augmented for Cote d'Ivoire by the money market rate from La Zone Franc
and World Bank files; for Ghana by the Bank of Ghana Annual Report and
for Nigeria by the Central Bank of Nigerial  Annual Report.  As explained
in the text, assumed gap between actual and market lending rates were
measured  by comparing actual  Treasury  bill rates  with estimates  of  market
clearing rates.
Parallel market exchange rate: World Currency Yearbook for 1978-86 and
Currency Alert for 1987-89.
Government Revenue: calculated from the government  revenue to GDP ratio,
in African Economic and Financial Data  (1989) Cote d'Ivoire 1980-85,
Ghana  1980-86,  Kenya,  Nigeria  and  Zambia,  1980-87.  Other  years
extrapolated  using the somewhat  different series in  Trends Ln  Developing
Economies (1989).
Other data including the TPS for Cote d'Ivoire  before 1986 and the rate
of remuneration on  bank reserves  were based on World Bank files and some
extrapolation.
37Table  1:  Taxation  of the  Financial  Sector
At End-Year  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 Average
COTE  d'IVOIRE
% of  GDP  3.0  5.8  1.7  1.7  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.6  0.9  1.1  1.1  2.1
% of  M2  9.7  20.7  6.7  6.6  8.6  8.1  6.5  5.4  3.1  3.7  3.7  7.5
% of  Govt  Revenue  N.A.  N.A.  6.9  7.0  8.8  7.4  6.1  5.8  4.1  5.5  5.6  6.4
GHANA
=z====
% of  GDP  2.8  12.1  10.9  1.6  13.1  0.6  1.4  2.4  2.8  1.9  1.7  4.7
X of  M2  14.9  62.5  72.9  11.9  91.1  7.6  13.2  21.1  24.8  15.9  13.3  31.8
X of  Govt  Revenue  N.A.  N.A.  190.9  30.7  236.5  8.7  15.1  19.8  19.9  13.4  12.8  60.9
…3==================2=====S=====  =SSSSZS==33=========S==3====SS…S=ta
KENYA
% of  GDP  1.3  3.9  2.9  3.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.8  1.0  0.9  1.6
% of  M2  3.8  12.2  10.3  11.4  3.3  3.2  2.8  3.4  2.9  3.5  3.4  5.5
%.  of  Govt  Revenue  N.A.  N.A.  13.0  14.1  4.5  4.1  3.6  4.1  3.9  4.4  4.0  6.2
NIGERIA
% of  GDP  1.4  2.8  4.0  1.0  8.0  7.5  0.7  2.5  1.0  8.6  6.3  4.0
%  of  M2  7.1  13.4  15.0  3.9  31.8  26.4  2.4  8.9  3.9  40.o  29.2  16.6
X of  Govt  Revenue  N.A.  N.A.  25.0  7.8  65.1  67.7  6.7  18.7  5.7  48.4  35.5  31.2
…  3  =  ======z==  s=  *=3=3  ====  =  …==  3====  ==3=3==3===srss-re--=====s======
ZAMBIA
%  of  GDP  2.3  2.8  3.3  3.3  6.0  6.5  10.6  4.5  7.8  11.7  18.9  7.1
% of  M2  8.9  9.5  12.0  11.9  18.4  20.7  40.1  22.4  33.5  40.8  62.1  25.5
%  of  Govt  Revenue  N.A.  N.A.  13.6  14.1  25.4  .d7.9  47.8  19.7  33.4  58.4  111.4  39.1
Note:  Based  on  Measure  1.
38Table  2:  Taxation  of  the  Financisl  Sector
("  of  GDP)
At  End-Year  1981  1982  1963  1984  1985  ¶986  1987  1988  Average
= ===  =zz  = =  =  ==  ......  an= ......  ==  asaaasgs-X  s-asssa  ussX8--ast-Sss-u--s--Sswswssaxs-=s  ..  aon..  .....  on  .........  s..  ssam=z  ==  ..... ss
COTE  d'IVOIRE  Currency  Tax  0.8  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8
-=======  Reserve  Requirement  Tax  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Govt)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Won-Govt)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Ineirect  Tax  0.9  1.2  1.1  0.9  0.8  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.7
Total  1.7  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.6  0.9  1.1  1.1  1.6
of  which  to  goverrment  0.8  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8
…===  =  =  3=333=33=3=3=333=5333=3=  3--  3333-3----3-33-333  S-as-S333S-333333U3S-3  -- 3  -- fl  -sMangums...  .....  M..=&  .... sss3===3......
GHANA  Currency  Tax  1.0  6.0  0.4  1.0  1.5  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.8
Reserve  Requiremant  Tax  0.5  2.7  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.3  0.6
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Govt)  0.0  2.4  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Non-Govt)  0.0  2.1  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.4
Indirect  Tax  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Total  1.6  13.1  0.6  1.4  2.4  2.8  1.9  1.7  3.2
of which  to  government  1.6  11.0  0.6  1.3  2.0  2.3  1.6  1.5  2.7
KENYA  Currency  Tax  0.9  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.6
Reserve  Requirement  Tax  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Govt)  0.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Mon-Govt)  1.7  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2
Indirect  Tax  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Total  3.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.8  1.0  0.9  1.2
of  which  to  government  1.4  0.8  0.9  0.7  0.9  0.8  1.0  0.9  0.9
=  =s  s=  = ===-....................-,  =--=--  ... 2...  .......  -as----  .....  ---.....  ..--.  ---------  ................  ----- ssssasss===22=asss====sss
NIGE  IA  Currency  Tax  0.4  1.9  1.9  0.5  0.7  0.5  1.8  1.3  1.1
Reserve  Requirement  Tax  0.3  1.2  0.9  0.3  0.5  0.3  1.1  0.7  0.6
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Govt)  0.1  1.2  1.7  0.0  0.6  0.0  2.0  1.2  0.9
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Non-Govt)  0.2  3.7  3.1  0.0  0.7  0.1  3.7  3.1  1.8
Indirect  Tax  0.0  0.0  00  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Total  1.0  8.0  7.5  0.7  2.5  1.0  8.6  6.3  4.5
of  which  to  government  0.8  4.3  4.4  0.7  1.8  0.9  4.9  3.2  2.6
ZAMBIA  Currency  Tax  0.7  1.0  1.2  1.7  1.1  1.4  1.9  3.6  1.6
Reserve  Requirement  Tax  0.6  0.9  1.0  1.4  0.9  2.8  2.9  4.3  1.9
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Govt)  0.3  1.3  1.1  2.1  1.0  1.6  3.5  4.3  1.9
Int  Ceiling  Tax  (Non-Govt)  1.7  2.8  3.2  5.3  1.5  2.0  3.4  6.8  3.3
Indirect  Tax  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
Total  3.3  6.0  6.5  10.6  4.5  7.8  11.7  18.9  8.7
of which  to  government  1.6  3.2  3.3  53  3.0  5.8  8.4  12.1  5.3
Note:  Based  on  Measure  1
39Table  3: Taxation  of the  Financial  Sector
(X  of  GOP,
At End-Year  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988 Average
COTE  d'IVOIRE  Measure  1  3.0  5.8  1.7  1.7  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.6  0.9  1.1  1.1  2.1
Measure  2  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.6  2.4  2.2  1.9  1.3  1.5  1.5  2.0
Measure 3  1.6  9.5  17.3  11.0  11.0  7.8  1.8  1.6  0.9  7.0  1.1  6.4
Measure 4  1.6  7.5  18.7  12.8  12.5  4.9  1.8  1.6  0.9  6.3  1.1  6.3
Measure  5  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.7  2.2  5.2  7.5  1.6  0.9  1.1  N.A.  2.5
Cash  flow*  1.6  0.9  0.8  -0.4  0.5  1.7  0.9  0.3  -0.4  -0.2  N.A.  0.6
GHANA  Measure  1  2.8  12.1  10.9  1.6  13.1  0.6  1.4  2.4  2.8  1.9  1.7  4.7
measure  2  3.1  3.2  2.4  2.9  2.2  1.3  2.4  1.5  1.2  1.1  1.2  2.0
Measure  3  1.4  1.9  2.1  1.6  37.3  4.7  2.3  4.7  7.6  2.6  3.2  6.3
Measure 4  8.3  1.4  25.0  13.7  0.8  0.6  4.4  4.7  1.2  3.2  1.5  5.9
Measure 5  2.0  4.5  7.3  1.6  4.3  3.3  1.9  4.2  2.6  2.8  N.A.  3.4
Cash flow*  1.2  3.5  4.7  1.0  3.3  4.5  4.9  2.4  2.7  2.1  N.A.  3.0
KENYA  Measure  1  1.3  3.9  2.9  3.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.9  0.8  1.0  0.9  1.6
Measure  2  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.6  1.7  1.8  1.7  1.5
Measure  3  1.7  4.7  14.2  8.0  3.0  3.8  0.8  0.9  0.8  3.4  4.5  4.2
Measure  4  2.8  3.6  17.5  9.9  0.8  3.8  0.7  1.3  4.4  1.1  1.2  4.3
Measure  5  5.8  0.3  0.4  4.6  0.8  0.9  1.4  6.8  3.1  1.0  N.A.  2.5
Cash flowu  0.9  0.7  0.9  0.2  0.5  0.3  0.7  1.2  1.1  0.6  N.A.  0.7
==================  33.===s=====ss=:uZ  SzZZ-...-u.  s=5=as2.:ZZss-u==-=Z=Z=:=-ZZ=Z===ZZs5=s*:=======*s
NIGERIA  Measure  1  1.4  2.8  4.0  1.0  8.0  7.5  0.7  2.5  1.0  8.6  6.3  4.0
Measure  2  2.2  2.3  3.1  3.1  3.3  3.4  3.6  3.4  2.2  0.8  -0.1  2.5
Measure  3  0.4  1.7  8.8  4.1  4.8  4.1  9.6  46.0  7.2  6.7  10.8  9.5
Measure  4  0.4  1.3  4.2  10.8  38.8  0.8  2.6  28.3  0.8  18.3  -0.1  9.7
Measure  5  2.6  11.3  0.6  1.2  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.7  3.4  7.1  W.A.  2.9
Cash fLow*  0.5  1.8  1.3  0.6  0.9  0.1  0.0  0.3  1.2  2.3  M.A.  0.9
…:=  ==  ==  ==  .. ====s======s.sxu.s  :n:z====s:.s=====s=zcstu:Umff=======Zf==-  ..S  ==sum  mu===s
ZAMBIA  Measure  1  2.3  2.8  3.3  3.3  6.0  6.5  10.6  4.5  7.8  11.7  18.9  7.1
Measure  2  3.4  3.8  3.6  3.7  4.4  4.2  2.7  1.2  3.6  4.8  5.1  3.7
Measure  3  2.0  4.4  7.3  4.4  20.1  14.8  30.3  18.0  2.2  7.0  24.8  12.3
Measure  4  0.4  5.1  0.9  6.1  15.1  30.2  18.5  17.3  2.2  64.5  3.0  14.9
Measure  5  0.5  3.2  3.6  3.4  3.2  3.8  4.4  20.9  5.3  12.4  M.A.  6.1
Cash flow*  -0.2  0.9  1.2  0.5  0.7  1.0  0.9  2.4  2.2  3.6  M.A.  1.3
*Seignorage  using  traditional  cash  flow  measure.
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45APPENDIX  1:  A  SIMPLE  MODEL  OF  BANK TAXES
1 Introduction and summary
Implicit and explicit taxation of the financial sector have an impact both on
budgetary flows and on the behavior of the financial system.  It is useful to
have a formal model within which these effects arise.  This paper presents a
simple model of banking sector behavior under a policy of interest rate
ceilings, reserve requirements and taxation.  It also shows how these policy
instruments impact the budget constraint of the government.  The objective is
to provide sufficient institutional detail to allow an understanding of the
roles of different types of tax and imposition, even at the cost of
precluding tidy analytical solutions for issues such as optimal levels of
taxation.
The key role of banks modelled here is that of selecting good loan projects.
This is a function on which the banks are able to spend resources, provided
sufficiently high interest rate spreads are allowed.  Policy interventions
will indirectly influence the rate of remuneration of deposits, the scale of
individual  banks and of the  banking system as a whole and the amount of
resources devoted to screening loan applications.  Specifically the model
assumes ceilings on bank lending rates, reserve requirements which are
remunerated at below-market interest rates and a tax on gross interest
receipts.
The effect of variations in these policy instruments  on bank behavior varies
according to whether the bank has access to government (or foreign)  bonds at
an attractive rate of interest.  If so (the interior solution case), the rate
of interest on deposits is fully determined by the intermediation cost wedge
imposed by the reserve requirements between the bond rate and the deposit
rate; but this wedge has no impact on the scale of lending.  Lending rate
ceilings have no impact on deposit rates, but they do influence the scale of
lending in the banking system and the degree to which resources are devoted
to screening; these effects being related to the implied  maximum permitted
spread above deposit rates.
If there is no attractive investment alternative (the corner solution) the
size of the intermediation cost wedge and the maximum permitted spread over
deposit rates both affect the scale of lending and to exactly the same
extent.  In this case the deposit rate still differs from the  marginal return
on free funds by the reserve requirements wedge, but the  marginal return is
now dependent on the the interest rate ceiling.
46The  impact  of the  tax  on gross  interest  receipts  is  analysed  within  the  same
framework:  in  general  it  is  equivalent  to,  or can  be offset  by simultaneous
adjustments  in the  other  instruments.
Using  a consistent  framework  and  notation  with  the  bank  behavior  model,
Section  3  presents  an analysis  of the  impact  of these  policies  on the
government's  budget. This  provides  in  particular  a simple  formula  for
evaluating  the  total  implicit  flow  of revenue  to  government.
The inherent  inefficiencies  in  the lending  process  and  the  likelihood  that
the  uncontrolled  banking  system's  spending  on  screening  resources  is less
than  the  social  optimum  leads  us to suggest  in Section  4 that  those  measures
that  achieve  the  desired  floe  of revenue  with the  least  impact  on the  lending
side  of  bank  behavior  are  to  be preferred. This turns  out  to  be an  argument
especially  against  lending  rate  ceilings.
472  The  model
2.1  The  nonbank  sector
Our  model  of the  nonbank  private  sector  is  very simplified.  The  sector  has
an exogenous  endowment  of purchasing  power  and  begins  each  period  with  an
inherited  wealth  being  the  stock  of currency  C and  bank deposits  D.  With
these  resources  and  facing  real  interest  rates  rC  and  rD as  well  as a
potential  lump-sum  tax  TN,  the  sector  chooses  its  current  consumption  and
new  holding  of currency  and  deposits  to  maximize  an  utility  function  which
depends  on the  sum  of current  utility  (depending  on consumption,  together
with  holdings  of currency  and  deposits)  and  the  real  value  of next  period's
starting  wealth. Next  period's  wealth  equals  the  starting  valne  of
currency  and  deposits  plus interest  less  erosion  in  the  real  value  due to
inflation  plus entrepreneurial  income  Y.  From  this  set-up  we may deduce
that  the  demand  for  currency  and  bank  deposits  depends  on the  two  real
rates  of return,  and  we assume  that  these  demand  functions  display
gross-substitutability.  Thus  we write  the  two  demand  functions  as:
D = g(rD,  rC).
C = h(rD,  rC).
with,
91  >0  92  <0
h, 1 <O  h 2 >°
The second argument of g is suppressed  below when appropriate.  Note that,
when no interest is paid on currency, the real rate of interest on currency
is simply the negative of  'he  rate of inflation, assumed to be known with
perfect foresight:
C r  =It.
Entrepreneurial income y arises from investments financed  by bank loans.
The nonbank private sector has a range of risky projects which can only be
financed by loans.  Any project which receives bank finance  will mature
after one period.  If its terminal value exceeds the amount due to the
bank, the surplus accrues to the nonbank private sector in the form of
entrepreneurial income.  If the project's terminal  value falls short of the
48amount owed, the bank suffers a loan-loss,  but the non-bank sector does not
suffer any loss.  (It  will be clear that this abstracts from a number of
interesting problems in risk-sharing and moral hazard.)
2.2 Behavior of the banking system
We model a banking system subject to certain interest rate controls and
reserve requirements.  SpeciEically  banks may hold reserves at the central
bank, government bonds, and loans a.  They issue deposits d.  For
simplicity  we neglect the banks' capital and vault cash holdings.
Controlled interest rates are those on government bonds rB,  on bank
reserves rR  and on bank loans rA.  (These  are real rates of interest; a
change in the expected rate of inflation  without a change in a controlled
nominal interest rate therefore implies a change in these rates).  A
regulated minimum percentage q of deposits must be held in the form of
reserves at the Central Bank.  The deposit interest rate rD is
competitively determined as is the number of banks.
The banking system is composed of identical  banks.  Each bank faces
parametric values of all interest rates and a fixed cost k of operations;
but the yield on its loan portfolio also depends on the resources it uses
to make credit assessments, as these  will reduce loan losses.  Based on a
simple screening mechanism described below, the default rate on loans f is
assumed to be inversely related to the monitoring effort x and positively
related to the quantity of loans a and the number of banks n competing in
the market.  Thus the profit of each bank may be written:
P  = (rn  A  _  (X,  a, n) -x)a  +r1qd  +r8((  1 -q)d  -a)-r  rDd  -k  .
1x<0  1°  >O  1fn>0.
Screening loan projects.  The bank chooses projects from a  population for
which the rate of return w is a stochastic  variable with density function
*(w;.).  At some cost, the  bank can establish a screen which will accept
only projects with a certain minimum value of the parameter s.  The mean
return  on  a portfolio screened to parameter level s  is:
£= f w4do(s)= f  wdO(s)+  fwcdO(s). 0'  J  f  rA
The  mean  loan  losses  experienced by a bank from such a portfolio is:
49=  3  I(r  - w)d+(s).
The  entrepreneurial  income  y accruing  to the  non-bank  private  sector
equals  the  total  return  on all  approved  projects  less  the  amount  paid  to
the  banks.
Y = £ - rAa + f
= X(w-  rA)d;(s).
A.
We assume  that  the  parameter  s  has a  monotonic  influence  on the  density
function  *(w:s),  so that:
SI  > 52  fI  wd O(sl  )> f  wdo  (s2)
f  wd(s,  ) > fJ  wdo(S 2 ).
t 2  j;~~~fo  wdO(s  ) >  fA  wd  O(s2)).
This implies  a  monotonic  relationship  between  s and  default  rate  f.  The
cost  ax of obtaining  enough  projects  satisfying  the  screen  s Is assumed  to
depend  on the  number  n of competitor  banks  and  the  total  value  of the  loan
portfolio. Accordingly  a functional  relationship  f(x,a,n),  may  be deduced
for  the  default  rate,  as  used  above.'
Note  that  the  bank's  choice  of  x minimizes  the  sum  of the  default  rate  f
ari  the  screening  cost  x, whereas  the  social  optimum  would  call  for
maximizing  the  mean return  £ less  the  cost  x.  Under  the  assumptions  given,
there  is  a less  than  optimal  amount  of screening  x.
Simpiifving  the  Drofit  function: The  profit  function  can  be rewritten  as:
P(a,d,x;z)-  p'(a,X;X)+  p 2(d;z)-kk
where
1  We neglect  the  possible  dependence  of the  function  f on the  controlled  loan
interest  rate  rA.
50!?'(a.  x;  ) - (?-  I(x,  a, n)-  x)a.
T2(d:  z)  - (r*q+ r(  1-  q)-  rD)d.
A  A  z-{r  r  r  q}
x  is  the  regulated  spread  between  loan  rates  and  the  government  bond rate,
while  z is  the  vector  of  all  policy  instruments.  The  first  term  in this
decomposition  of the  profit  function  is independent  of the  level  of
deposits  and  the  second  term  is independent  of the  portfolio  of the  bank.
With the  deposit  rate  rD  determined  by competition  between  banks,  the
coefficient  of d is  zero 2, giving:
rD _ rJ -q(r-r).  (-1  )
This  allows  us to concentrate  on the  first  term  in  the  profit  function  P.
The  bank cannot  lend  more than  its  deposit  resources  net  of required
reserves. Accordingly,
0  S  a  S(1  - q)d
2.3  Market  equilibrium
We distinguish  between  two  distinct  situations,  first  the  interior
solution,  where  the  banks  are  voluntarily  holding  government  bonds  and
second  the  corner  solution  where  the  government  bond rate  is too  low  and
none are  held.  The response  of the  system  to  policy  changes  is  quite
different  in these  two  polar  situations 3.
Although  each  bank takes  the  deposit  rate  as parametric,  the  market  supply
of deposits  is downward  sloping:
nd = (rD  (2)
We assume  excess  supply  of loan  proposals  at all  relevant  interest  rates,
though  the  net return  on these  loans  is  also  downv4ard  sloping  in  view  of
the incidence of defaults.
2 If the deposit rate were regulated, it would have to be less than r'q.  r'(1  -q)
and the supply of deposits would be exogenous to each bank.
?  The interior solution can also be interpreted as the solution which will
prevail if the banks are allowed to hold foreign investments freely.
51Competitive market equilibrium implies  zero profits.  Therefore the value
added of cach bank is (ax  s  k).  Because of (1)  zero profits implies:
(X-  I(x,  a,  n)-  x)a  = k.  (3)
(a)  The interior solution.  If the bank's maximising choice of monitoring
effort and portfolio mix leads it to an interior solution, with nonzero
holdings of both government bonds and loans, the first-order conditions
imply:
f(X.  a.  n)  =  .(4)
f 0 (x,  a, n)-  ka  -2  =  O  (5)
The equilibrium is given by equations (1) to (5); this system has a
recursive pattern, with equation (1)  determining rD.  Equations (3), (4)
and (5) represent a simultaneous system determining x, a and n; finally the
level of deposits d is determined from equation (2), knowing rD, x, a and
n.  The impact of the policy variables q and rR is on the deposit rate rD.
The policy variable A  does not affect rD,  but it does affect the portfolio
decision.  This pattern of causali.:y  is shown in figure 1.
An increase in X will surely increase the number of banks.  This can be
seen by totally differentiating the zero-profit condition (3), recalling
('.)  and applying the envelope theorem (or (4) and (5))  to obtain 4:
n  > O.  (6a)
Therefore, since rD is unaffected by N
6logd  = _  1og  d  (6b)
Thus, an increase in the regulated spread  x  will reduce the deposit
portfolio of the individual bank, while leaving overall deposits in the
system unchanged.
While the impact of A  on the  x and a is indeterminate in general,
assumptions on the second derivative of the default function f  may
determine its sign.  For example, assuming that the marginal return on
monitoring effort f. is independent  of the number of loans (f..  - 0)  would
4 Note that the crowding-out condition fn  >  0 is  essential for the existence
of equilibrium.
52allow one to show that the impact of x  on x and a has the same sign as -f.
and -fa respectively.  The first of these will be positive if the marginal
return on monitoring declines with the  number of competing banks; the
second would be negative if an increase in the number of banks worsens the
impact of increasing loan volume on defaults.  These three assumptions (rca
- 0; f,n  <  0; fa  >  0)  would then imply:
-a<  0  -x>  0  (6c) 6k<  6x>  (c
I.e. an increase in x  increases  monitoring expenditure but under these
assumptions would actually reduce the volume of loans per bank.  Since the
number of banks would increase, the impact on total loans could be
positive.  As an alternative assumption, which does not require fx.  - 0, we
may specify the functional form of f  as exponential:
f-vexp{-ax+  fBa+yn)
This  eliminates  the  someihat  implausible  negative  impact  of  x  on loan  size.
Once again, f. < 0;  f,  >  0,  but this time f^.  <  0. For the exponential
form we obtain explicit solutions:
6a6x
6-=0  6A  - 1  (6c')
We conclude under the exponential assumption that an increase in the
allowable spread will expand the use of factor resources for monitoring by
the banking system, that it  will reduce the deposit portfolio of the
individual bank (and therefore shrink its holdings of government paper),
and that it will increase the number of banks.  The loan portfolio of the
individual  bank would be unaltered in this situation.
The other policy variables, i.e. the reserve requirements and the interest
rates on reserves and on government  bonds affect the system in this
interior solution only through their direct impact on the deposit interest
rate, (so long as we are considering compensated policy changes, i.e. those
which do not affect the allowable spread  N).
Specifically, the relation between the deposit rate, the rate on required
reserves and the government bond rate, wnich in this interior solution case
is the marginal yield of free funds, can be rewritten,
r D=r  -r . ,
53where,
q=D  q(r  -r ).
The term  p.can  be thought  of  as the  marginal  wedge  to intermediation  costs
added  by the  reserve  requirements.  This  formulation  becomes  usefu'l  when
looking  at the  c'rner  solution  in  which  government  bonds  are  not  bought.
The  compa  ative  statics  of  policy  actions  in the  interior  solution  is
straightforward  and  are  set  out  in  Table  1.  If  we treat  the  avaiiable
policy  instruments  as  ,u,r'.  and  q, these  divide  into  two  groups;  the  first
is  N  increases  in this  lending  margin  increase  total  loans  an and
screening  activity  x; they  lower  d  and  the  quantity  of government  bonds
sold,  while  leaving  the  deposit  interest  rate  rD  and  therefore  total
deposits  D unchanged. Relaxations  in the  remaining  policy  instruments  all
increase  rD,  as  well as each  bank's  deposits  d  and total  bond  sales,  while
leaving  the  lending  portfolio,  resources  spent  on lending  and  the  number  of
banks  unchanged. (If  the  instruments  are  treated  as  r',r'rl,  and  q, then
relaxations  in  the  last  three  without  an increase  in  rAwill  have the
effect  of reducing  x  and thus  causing  a contraction  in lending  activity.)
(b)  The  corner  solution:  no  voluntary  purchases  of government  bonds. If
the  interest  rate  on government  bonds  is  set  too  low,  then  none  will  be
bought. In solving  the  system,  this  implies  replacing  (1),  which  no longer
holds,  by (1'):
a  = (1-  q)d  (1')
Apart  from  this  only  one  other  change  needs  to be  made: (3)  is replaced  by
(3'):
f +  x - ('  - j)+ - =0  (3') a
where
AX=  rA_rD
and  .is  as defined  above.
If  A'  and  i±are  taken  as parametric,  the  system,  (3'),  (4)  and (5)  is  still
a self-contained  one  determining  x, a and  n.  Equation  (1')  thtn  determines
d,  knowing  a.  Finally  (2)  determines  rD. The  pattern  of causality  is
shown  in figure  1.  The implication  of this  recursive  pattern  is that  the
54derivatives of x, a, and n with respect  .'are  as before; with respect to It
they are equal in size but with opposite sign to those with respect to A'.
However the impact of X'on the deposit interest rate is no longer zero: an
increase in  '  increases  both the asset size per bank and the number of
banks so that there must be an increase in total deposits and therefore in
the deposit interest rate.
The compprative statics of policy actions in the corner solution differ
somewhat from that in the interior solution.  Again these are set out in
Table 1.  Clearly rB is not a relevant instrument in this case provided it
remains below the point at which bonds will be bought voluntarily.
Treating the remaining policy instruments  as ^'.I.and  q,  the division is
now between q  and the others.  A lowering of q  without any modification of
the others will actually lower interest rates enough to reduce total
deposits by the amount of reserves released and leave lending activity
unaltered.  Relaxation of the other two instruments  will increase deposit
interest rates and lending activity.  (If the instruments  are treated as
rd,ro,and q, then a relaxation in q  will have a small positive effect on
lending activity.)
2.4 Explicit tax on interest receipts
Several countries impose a tax on all interest receipts of the banks.  This
can readily be added to the model in the form of a tax rate -a  Thus the
profit of the bank becomes:
P2 - ((1--X)r,4-  f(x,  a,n)-x)a+  (1  -- )rlqd+  (1 -- )rs((  1-q)d  -a)-rodtR)
After substitution, and after replacing x  with '  this
modification affects only  ?2and  thus only the deposit interest rate
condition (1').  We conclude that a change in the rate of tax - compensated
by a change in the allowable lending rate will have its impact only on and
through the deposit rate 5.
5 At low values of x  and -,  an increase in  s  will, for given rA  actually
increase  the  after  tax margin  X', and  therebv  encourage  increased  use  of
resources x.  But at higher values of x  or x  the opposite is the case.  The
criterion is:
2  rD
In Cote d'Ivoire the TPS rate appears to have been Just lower than this
criterion during the 1980s.  This was also true in  Thailand and, except for
1984-85, the Philippines.
55For  the  corner  solution,  replacing  W by
IL-  q  (r-  - (  - Or").
(as  well as replacing  xby  An  is  sufficient  to  allow  use  of the  previous
analysis.
The comparative statics are once again set out in Table 1.  If we treat the
available policy instruments as x  and q, the impact of - in the
interior solution case is similar to that of, say q; in the corner
solution, changes in -rhave  no effect because of the compensating changes
in the policy rates of interest induced by holding  A'.'  constant.  (If the
instruments are treated as rA,rt,rl,  and q, then - has a similar effect to q
or to rR  in the interior solution case, provided x  and r are small, and a
similar effect to rR in the corner solution case.)
2.5 Inflation
This section sketches the implications of inflationary financing.  To a
large extent this is a straightforward extension in steady state, but it
should be noted that the complex expectational issues involved in changing
inflation rates and transitions from one steady state to another are not
treated here.  We take it that all behavioral relationships of the economy
ensure that there exists a stationary state with no expansion of currency
and no changes in the ceiling interest rates or in the reserve requirements
and in  which the inflation rate is zero.  Because all behavioral equations
have been expressed as dependent on real rates of return, steady state
inflation  with perfect foresight will be characterized by a constant rate
of expansion of all nominal aggregates at the rate of inflation.
Provided that all controlled interest rates are indexed to the rate of
inflation, the solution of the bank behavior model will be as before.
Fully anticipated inflation introduces no distortion into this model
provided interest rates on all assets are indexed.  However, as this
proviso must extend to interest  paid on currency, most interesting cases
violate it.  Therefore we briefly consider two alternative scenarios: (i)
all controlled nominal interest rates except that on currency indexed to
rate of inflation and (ii)  all controlled nominal interest rates fixed and
do not move with inflation.  In either case, the explicit tax rate on
interest receipts is effectively increased if, as is usually the case, the
tax base is nominal interest receipts.
56(i) If currency does not bear indexed interest then a higher rate of
inflation will result in an increased supply of deposits to the banks.
This upward shift in the deposit supply function will result in a higher
quantity of deposits and holding of bonds by the banks in the interior
solution case, but no change in the (real)  deposit interest rate.  The
spread x  is unchanged.  In the corner  solution case the upward shift in
deposit supply will result in a lower real deposit interest rate, higher
deposit holdings and, because of a higher x*-',  more banks and more spending
x.
(ii) If all of the controlled interest rates are lower by the higher rate
of inflation then Xwill  not change, but (in the interior  solution) the
nominal deposit interest rate will be lower by the rate of inflation,
possibly resulting in lower deposits and lower bank holding of bonds.  In
the corner solution, there will probably be a reduction in  i.  ,  as banks bid
for deposits, and this  will tend to reduce the number of banks and the
spending x.
3 The government's budget constraint
The government has non-distorting non-interest expenditure G and
non-distorting, non-financial taxes  TX,  The traditional  budget constraint is;
G +  (r3 +n)B+(rR+n)Q=TNv+TF+  AB+AC+  AQ.  (9)
This shows the deficit being financed by expansion of the  bond issue, by
printing currency and by increase in the required reserves.  In a steady
state with constant inflation, fixed interest rates and reserve requirement
ratio each of these financing options is fully determined.  A higher reserve
requirement will lower the quantity of bonds held voluntarily by the banking
system as will a lowering of either the rate of interest on bonds or on
reserves.  A  higher (but constant) rate of expansion of nominal government
debt, including currency, will also, through its influence on inflation and
through this on the deposit supply function lower the amount of bonds
voluntarily held by the banking system.
In  steady state inflation,  B, C and Q  will all grow at the same proportional
rate.
The augmented budget deficit recognizes the subsidy being given to  bank
borrowers on both sides of the constraint:
G+oA+(r+  n)B+(rl+  n)Q=TN+TF+OA+AB+BAC+AQ.  (10)
57Maintaining the same level of non-interest expenditure, including  whatever
expenditure is needed to keep the banks borrowers at equivalent levels of net
interest,  but removing interest ceilings, reserve requirements and financial
taxes T', would involve additional non-distorting taxes z, where,
-A  A  h  - C  - G+(r  _r  )A+(r  +n)B+(r  +rt)C-TN+AB+AC+z,  (11)
where the barred variables represent the hypothetical rates of interest and
stocks of bonds and currency in the  hypothetical non-distorting situation.
Because of the different interest rates, the composition of the private
sector's portfolio of bonds and currency will differ from the distorting
case.  We choose to fix the total  nominal debt of the government as the same
in the actual and hypothetical non-distorting cases, with the mix between 2i
and C determined by the rates of interest implied  by the zero profit condition
on currency issue.  We also take the expected inflation rate to be determined
by a constant rate of expansion of nominal debt equivalent to the rate of
expansion of nominal debt in the actual situation.  Thus,
-c  -0
r  = r
A(B+C)  A(B+C+Q)
B +  C  B+ C+ Q
B+ C= B+ C+ Q.
Subtracting, we obtain,
z-r  C+ (r-  -rl)Q+  (r-r  r)B+  (r  r)A  +  T  +  5tmaindr.  (12)
The remainder arises out of portfolio shifts between different elements of
the government debt as between the two situations.  In fact the net effect of
these shifts is of second order and likely to be negligible as may be seen
from:
Remainder=r  (B_-B-Q)+rC  (C-C)
but,  B+C+Q=  B+C,
..  ~~~~B-B-Q=-(C-C),
Remainder  = (r  -r  )(C-C)
=  Cost(C  - C)
58Where  Cost  is the  percentage  cost  of  producing  currency,  which  can  safely  be
taken  to  be a small  number,  perhaps  one  per  cent  per  annum.
594 Welfare implications
To attempt to draw firm welfare conclusions from such a simple model would be
foolhardy.  It is nonetheless of interest to see what can be said on the
welfare front.  In terms of the utility function briefly described above, the
distortions on interest ceilings, reserve requirements and taxes, relate
mainly to the mix of deposits and currency chosen by the non-bank private
sector, and to the entrepreneurial income.  By distorting the absolute and
relative real returns on currency and deposits, the government reduce-
welfare from the current period utility functional relative to what would be
achieved in the undistorted situation with lump-sum taxation.  It also tends
to impact on the terminal wealth especially via the entrepreneurial income,
both through influencing the volume of bank loans and the amount of screening
which takes place.
In principle these effects could be evaluated by explicit choice of
functional form and parameter values.  That is all that could be said if the
financial system were first-best efficienLt  in the absence of distortions.  In
particular, small taxes would have small effects and the ranking of different
small taxes in welfare terms would not really be possible.  Note however that
the modelling of the bank screening function  highlights a built-in
inefficiency in the financial system in that the bank does not internalize
the entrepreneurial surplus Y in choosing between loan proposals.  To that
extent, the uncontrolled bank tends to underspend on loan assessment.  The
introduction of a small tax on the financial sector might then result in
first-order  welfare losses to the extent that it results in a further
reduction in spending x and in loan quantity an.
This is a specific illustration of a more general problem.  The informational
and agency problems which exist in credit markets suggest that, even in the
absence of the policy interventions being studied here, lending quantiti2s
and the use of resources for assessing lending  projects may be below the
first-best quantity.  If so, policy interventions  which further reduce the
lending activity of the financial system may be regarded as likely to be more
distortionary than others.  Strictly speaking this provides a guideline for
ranking only small policy distortions; if the policy-induced distortions are
themselves large there is no presumptw-on  as to which pre-existing distortion
is the most important.
fi^)If this is a good guideline, then, where the interior solution seems
relevant, a relaxation of binding ceilings on lending margins would be
preferred to reductions in reserve requirements or in taxes on bank receipts
or increases in other rates of interest  not affecting lending margins.  In
the corner solution the same would be true, though here a reduction in the
wedge ()  imposed by the low remuneration of reserve requirements would also
have merit according to our analysis 6.
List of Variables
rA  ceiling rate of interest on loans (advances).
r  rate of interest on government bonds (one year).
rc  rate of interest paid on currency.
rD  rate of interest on bank deposits.
rt  rate of interest on required reserves.
a  quantity of loans (advances)  made by individual bank.  A - na.
d  quantity of deposits accepted by individual  bank.  D - nd.
f  rate of default or loan-losses of bank.
k  fixed costs of bank.
n  number of banks.
q  required reserves as a fraction of deposits.  Q  - qD.
x  expenditure on resources by banks, per dollar lent.
s  quality parameter for a project.
w  stochastic rate of return on a project.
z  required amount of non-distorting tax to replace interest ceilings.
B  government bond issue (stock).
C  currency issue (stock).
G  (non-distorting)  government expenditure.
T'  tax on financial sector.
TX  non-distorting tax (non-financial sector).
y entrepreneurial income.
a  rate of subsidy for  borrowers from banks.
it  expected inflation rate.
6 This ranking is  based on the steady-state analysis and does not take
account of the issue of super-neutrality of taxes discussed elsewhere in this
paper.
61i  intermediation  wedge  caused  by reserve  requiremsnts.
P-M qq(r  a-r).
x  allowable spread over deposit rate.
k  -rX-r 0
rA  rt  r  ,market  clearing  rates  for  the  case  of$  "non-distorting  government";
Cost.
62Table  1:  Impact  of  policy  on  bank  behavior
INTERIOR  CORNER
x,n  a  rD  d  D  Bonds  x,n  a  rD  d  D
7+t  0  0  - 0  - +  0  +  +  +
As  (W')  0  0  +  +  +  +  +  0  +  +  +
rot  0  0  +  +  +  +  0  0  0  0  0
0  0  +  +  +  +  0  0  - - -
0  0  +  +  +  +  0  0  0  0  0
+  0  0  - 0  - +  0  +  4  +
r"t  - 0  +  +  +  +  +  0  +  +  +
rt  - 0  +  +  +  +  +  0  0  0  0
- 0  . . . +  +  0  -
- 0  +  +  +  +  +  0  +  +  .
*Assumes  low  values  of  .
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This appendix presents some background notes on relevant developments in the
countries to complement the discussion of Section 3 in the text.
COTE d'IVOIRE
As a member of the franc zone, with a fixed exchanpe rate vis-a-vis the
French franc for over forty years, the range of poicy  instruments available
to the Ivorian government for raising revenue from the banking system has
been somewhat constrained.  The inflation rate is essentially determined
externally.  Over a quarter of a century cumulative CPI inflation has been
almost exactly the same as in France (see Figure  A4, which also plots the CPI
for Cameroonl).  IntereFt rate differentials  have also been constrained,
especially i.n  recent years.  (See  Figure Al, which shows the French interest
rates along with those for Cote d'Ivoire).
Although Cote d'Ivoire has been no more insulated than other countries from
external commodity price shocks, these have had remarkably little influence
on tha monetary aggregates.  Government deficits have been financed either by
the Central Bank of the monetary union - hence spreading the  burden across
the entire zone - as in the early 1980s, or through the accumulation of
payments arrears.
There is subsidized lending to the  non-government sector.  But because, with
minor exceptions, the subsidized loans are refinanced by the Central Bank,
this subsidy does not represent a tax on the financial system.
Bank lending rates are capped at rates which, for the bulk of lendilg, are
higher, or close too, market clearing rates.  Certain classes of lending
(especially the sectors treated as preferential and ther -ore  subject to
;v-.ier  regulated lending margins) are probably limited  interest rate
ceilings, but there is no basis for arguing for a majo' tax source here.
Given that the rate of inflation and interest rates have been more or less
externally determined, and that there are no reserve requirements it has been
left to explicit taxation of the financial intermediaries to provide the  bulk
of whatever tax revenue is collected.
Cc.e d'Ivoire has generally adopted a VAT approach to indirect taxation, but
financial services are taxed according to a separate regime including the
taxe sur la prestation des services (TPS) 2, which is levied on the gross
receipts of banks (gross interest  earnings and fee income, etc.) and the new
tax on loan balances (taxe sur les encours de credit, TEC).  Up to 1986 the
rate of TPS was 25%.  During 1987 it  was reduced twice so that from 1 January
1988 the figure was 10%.  The TEC was introduced in 1987 at a rate of 0.05%
per quarter (annualized rate of 2%).  It is not known what share of the
banks' revenue comes from non-VAT registered entities, but it could be in the
region of one-half.
1 Cameroon's experience with financial sector taxes is very similar to that
of Cote d'Ivoire.
2 Note that TPS paid by enterprises  which are registered for the VAT are
deductible from such enterprises' VAT liabilities. This is an important
conceptual attraction of the TPS/VAT system as it avoids double taxation of
banking services insofar as they represent intermediate rather than final
services.  Taking the VAT system as a given, the additional revenue raised
from the imposition of TPS is  much 'ess than the amount paid by the banks.
Only that portion of TPS which comes from interest  and other payments made by
non-VAT registered persons is additional.
65Cote  d'Ivoire  has  encountered  a  3erious  problem  of  bank  insolvency  in  recent
years  - perhaps  the  worsc  case  of  the  five  countries  in  the  sample.  As
discussed  in  the  text,  both  the  policy  environment  that  has  contributed  to
these  failures  and  the  bail-out  of  depositors  which  is  in  progress  has  a
quasi-tax  interpretation  whieh  we  do  not  use  here.
Measure 1  Findings:  Because  nomninal  interest  rates  were  higher  than  the  rate
of  inflation  throughout  most  of  the  1980s,  there  is  no  contribution  of
interest  rate  ceilings  to  Measure  1.  However,  interest  ceilings  may  have
been  a  constraint  in  1978-80  and  there  is  a  substantial  measured  contribution
from  them  in  those  years  giving  much  higher  overall  financial  sector  taxation
in  at  end-1978  and  1979  than  in  any  subsequent  years.  The  reduction  in the
rate  of  TPS  in  April  1986  contributed  to  an  appreciable  lowering  of  the
measured  tax.  Since  then  the  TPS  collects  less  than  0.3  Der  cent  of  GNP.
Because  most  of  the  tax  is  in  the  form  of  the  cu.rrency  tax,  the  relative
burden  on  the  formal  finanicial  sector  i- small:  now  less  than  one-third  of
the  total.
GHANA
Ghana  is  the  sub-Saharan  nountry  that  has  experienced  the  highest  inflation
rates.  The  values  observed  in  1977-1978,  1981  and  1983  were  around  or
greater  than  100  percent.  Furthermore,  these  rates  underestimate  the  erosion
of  currency  because  two  episodes  of  demonetization  occurred.  As  is  always
the  case  in  these  experif:nces,  the  large  inflation  tax  reflected  poor  tax
administration  and  the  government  deficit.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  first
case  of triple  digit  inflation  occurred  during  the  cocoa  price  boom  when  the
revenues  of  the  government  should  have  been  higher  than  average  (The  cocoa
crop  had  unfortunately  been  sold  on  the  future  market  at  pre-boom  prices).
The  creation  of  money  and the  resulting  tax  on  money  through  inflation  were
not  the  only  sources  of  currency  tax  in  Ghana.  Two  currency  reforms  took
place 3 :  The  ,rst  on  March  9,  1979,  when  cash  was  exchanged  at  the  rate  of
70% for  holdings  of  up  to  5,000  Cedis,  and  at  the  rate  of  50%  for  holdings
greater  than  5,000  Cedis  (provided  that  cash  holders  were  willing  to  reveal
large  holdings).  Bank  deposits  were  unaffected  durinig  this  first  reforr-.
The  currency  reform  reduced  the  currency  in  circulation  by  39% at  the  time  of
the  reform.  In  1982,  the  largest  banknote  in  circulation,  the  Ce.  50  note
was  demonetized.  The  capital  levy  on  financial  assets  had  two  effects:
first  it  generated  an  immediate  impact  on  the  money  to  GDP  ratios.  Second,
it  damaged  the  credibility  of  the  financial  system.
The  decline  in  the real  value  of  money  induced  an  increase  in  the  effective
tax  rate  on  cocoa  producers:  in  a  country  like  Ghana  where  the  cocoa  crop  is
sold  to  a  marketing  board  that  is  controlled  by  the  government,  it  is
institutionally  easier  to  increase  the  price  level  while  maintaining  a  fixed
nominal  producer  price  than  to  lower  the  producer  prices.  In  this
institutional  framework  the  depreciation  of  the  currency  is  a  fiscal
instrument  that  has  uses  beyond  the  strict  purpose  of  seignorage.  Of  course,
the  high  taxation  of  producers  stimulated  smuggling  of  cocoa  to  neighboring
Cote  d'lvoire.  (Some  have  estimated  at  40% the share  of  smuggling  in  the!
cocoa  crops  during  the  periods  of  high  taxation).
3  As  discrete  and  presumably  unanticipated  events,  these  have  not  been
cour;ted  in  to  the  measures  reported  in  the  text.
66raring the periods of high inflation rates, the exchange rate was fixed and
grossly overvalued.  The purpose of this policy was to tax maintain a high
tax rate on exporters (cf. Pinto, 1986).  Imports  were restricted by
licenses.  Because the .. o-.nal  exchange rate was completely out of line with
the scarcity of foreign exchange, an active black market developed.  The
parallel market premium over the official rate reached very hig-z  values.
Policy in the Adjustment Period
Following the policy shift in 1983, inflation fell sharply, though it
remained relatively high reaching almost 40 percent in 1987.  The experience
of other countries shows that stopping inflation  effectively requires a firm
commitment to avoid monetary financing  of the fiscal deficit.  No such
commitment is evident in the Ghanaian data.  From the third quarter of 1984
to the same period in 1988, the monetary base increased at an average annual
rate of 40 percent.  This growth  was obviously induced  by the expansion of
the credit to the government as witr.ess  the fact that total bank credit to
the government  grew at an annual rate of 48 percent during the same period.
Thus policy did not convev a very strong signal that inflation  was over.  The
best guarantee against the renewal of inflation  would be to let the expansion
of financial assets be determined by the process of financial intermediation
in  which banks match the savings in deposits and real investment.  However,
credit to the private sector increased in the adjustment period at an annual
rate of only 10 percent, and this  was from a very small base, because credit
to the private sector had been almost eliminated  before the adjustment began:
it has represented less than one percent of GDP since 1984.
The Demand for Money in Ghana (1972-1988)
The first period of high inflation in Ghana occurred in 1977 when the rate
exceeded 100 percont per annum.  Between 1977 and 1984, the inflation rate
fluctuated a great  ieal,  with high values in 1979, 1981 and 19834.  In 1984 a
change of policy regime took place with the implementation  of the adjustment
program.  A glance at monetary data indicate that there was a response to the
sustained inflation  For example, the Ml to GDP ratio decreased from 21 per
cent in the fourth quarter of 1976 to less than 12 percent in the first
quarter of 1979.
Looking more closely, money demand equations were estimated to check for a
shift in response to the policy change.  The model estimated was of the error
correction type, following the two equations:
YL  - alpt-l  +  a2 X1  +  U,  (1)
Yt  Yt-i - bl(p,  - p,1)  +  b2ut +  b3zt +  et  (2)
where the terms xt  and zt  represent vectors of exogenous variables, pt is  the
rate of inflation, ut  and et  are disturbances, and y, represents the
endogenous variable the real money stock.
4 Price controls were implemen:ed  at various times since 1975.  Although
these controls were not fully effective, nevertheless, they are likely to
ha-e affected the reporting of price indices and the measurement of the
inflation rate.
67Estimating this system (using instrumental  variables) on quarterly data for
(the log of) real M25 in the period before 1984 gives a reasonably good fit.
Specifically, the exogenous variables x were a constant and two permanent
intercept shift dummies, taking the value unity after the first quarter of
1979 and the second quarter of 1981 respectiveiy; the exogenous  variables z
were a constant term and the level and lagged value of a third dummy being
the sum of the other two.  The equations were estimated by instrumerLtal
variables, using bank credit to government, ban'>  credit to private sector,
total credit and special deposits (all expressed as a share of GDP), as
instruments, together with the lagged endogenous and predetermined variables
in the first equation, and the first difference of these variables for the
estimation of the second equation.  The estimated equations are as follows.
M2 = - 0.328 P - 0.655 D79 - 0.486 D81 - 0.342
(3.7)  (6.4)  (4.0)  (6.2)
RSQ - 0.894  SEE - 0.196  DW - 0.665  72:4-84:2
dM2 - - 0.304 dP - 0.302 U +  0.144 D3 - 0.065 D3(-l) -0.051
(2.6)  (2.3)  (3.4)  (1.6)  (2.1)
RSQ - 0.376  SEE - 0.110  DW - 1.906  74:1-84:2
The dummy variables in the first equation correspond to the dates where
special levies were applied to financial assets.  The implication of these
demand functions are that the levies exerted a permanent impact on the demand
for money.  The estimated impact of the two shocks depressed the level of the
demand for money by 62 percent, in addition of the inflation impact that is
represented by the inflation term in the equation.
Note that this equation predicts only an average growth rate 1984-87 of 1.2
per cent compared to the actual 6.2 per cent; this difference is found to be
significant.  Furthermore, a dummy trend variable 6 included for the period
after 1984 turns out to be significant  when the equation is estimated over
1972-87.  Indeed this dummy variable "explains"  a growth of five per cent per
quarter.
M2 - - 0.253 P - 0.665 D79 - 0.558 D81 +  0.019 D84 - 0.315
(3.4)  (6.2)  (4.7)  (2.5)  (6.3)
RSQ - 0.904  SEE - 0.183  DW - 0.702  72:4-88:2
dM2 - - 0.273 dP - 0.31.9  U +  0.151 D3 - 0.082 D3(-l) -0.034
(3.1)  (2.3)  (4.5)  (2.4)  (1.8)
RSQ - 0.477  SEE - 0.102  DW - 1.847  74:1-88:2
Analysis of the demand for  money in Kenya thus suggests that inflation is an
important determinant, but that confidence in the overall policy stance is
also relevant in predicting money holdings.
5 We have therefore used the real level of financial assets where the
deflator is the CPI index.  There are somie  obvious pitfalls that follow from
this procedure and we will try to talke  them into account.  For the
determination of the inflation rate,  we have first computed the rate of
change between the price level in a given quarter and that of the same
quarter in the previovs year, and then we average these values over four
consecutive quarters.
6 This variable is zero before the second quarter of 1984, and is a time
trend thereafter.
68Measure 1  Flndings:  Ghana gives the  highest measures of financial taxation,
with a peak at end-1982 of 91.1% of M2, or well over twice the explicit
government revenue.  At this peak, rather less than a half was currency tax.
Most went to government: credit to the private sector was so low (see Figure
A2) that the very low interest ceilings  benefitted only a comparatively small
amount of non-government borrowing.  It is of interest to note (from  Text
Table 2) that the timepath of the cash-flow measure of seignorage is quite
different from that of the currency tax, though over the decade the two
average out fairly close to one another.
KENYA
Sudden changes in the prices of its main export crops, tea and coffee, have
had a destabilizing effect on the Kenyan economy over the years.  Two
particular episodes of export boom followed  by contraction both left the
government overexposed, having expanded expenditure to a level that could not
easily be financed in non-boom years.  The first episode followed the 1976
coffee boom and coincided  with the terms of trade shock of 1979-80.  By the
early 1980s, internal and external imbalances  were seriously threatening the
economy.  The budget deficit - largely financed  by borrowing from the Central
Bank - reached 9.5 percent of GDP in 1981.  The resulting expansion in the
money supply was accompanied by an acceleration of inflation to as high as an
annual rate of 22 percent in 1982.
From December 1982, a successful stabilization  was implemented.  But a second
coffee boom in 1986 led to a recurrence of domestic imbalances.  Government
expenditure was increased  drastically, resulting in a deficit that  was
financeable in 1986 without placing pressure on external reserves, but
resulted in a balance of pavments crisis in 1987 when the coffee prices fell.
As in the 1981-2 deficit, the Government had recourse to the banking system
for financing.  This time however the financing was shared between the
Central Bank and the Commercial Banks and in addition, increased  holdings of
reserves by the commercial  banks acted to limit the monetary impact of the
deficit.  Nevertheless,  M2 increased  by 32 percent in 1986.  By 1988, the
government had embarked on another stabilization program; Government
borrowing from the banking system fell during 1988.
In the past few years, the Ke.ayan  government has moved gradually towards a
more market-oriented inteiest rate regime.  The policy of fixed nominal bank
interest rates was eased somewhat in the early 1980s though real interest
rates remained negative until 1983.  Government securities are now openly
auctioned and a secondary  market is developing.  Spreads between savings
deposit rates and maximum lending rates have been increased from 3 to 5
percent for commercial banks.
Despite the two episodes of severe macroeconomic imbalance, inflation in
Kenya has remained comparatively low on average.  This reflects the
relatively prompt adjustments which have been implemented in 1983 and 1988.
Gradually too, interest rates have moved towards market clearing rates.
Measure  1  Findings:  With inflation in single digits since 1984 and interest
rate ceilings comparatively unconstraining, taxation on financial sector  has
been comparatively low since 1982.  The rate of taxation  has remained at or
below 1 percent of GNP.
NIGERIA
The macroeconomic history of Nigeria in the 1980s is dominated by two
factors, the fluctuating fortunes of oil exports and the increasing
overvaluation of the Naira before 1985 and its subsequent rationalization.
The decline in oil revenues during 1981-83 was at first  partly absorbed by a
considerable expansion in the fiscal deficit during 1981 and 1982.  For
instance, imports continued to grow rapidly during 1982 despite the sharp
69fall in expart receipts.  This large fiscal deficit was at first funded at
the Centra  Bank wit  comparatively little pressure on the domestic banking
system.  There was a corresponding drawdown of foreign reserves,  but by early
1983 90 per cent of the reserves of just two years before had been eroded.
Government turned to the domestic banking system in a large way.  Inflation
accelerated dramatically.
Following the partial fiscal correstion of 1984-85, a further surge of
inflatio:.  began in early 1987 corresponding to a sharp worsening of the
government's deficit resulting inter alia from the fall in oil prices.  This
time the main contributor to domestic financing of the government was the
Central Bank.  The unification of the exchange rate  may not have contributed
much directly to inflation  as many goods were already valued at parallel
market exchange rates.
Exchange rate liberalization took place in stages  beginning in September
1986.  Although the market did not always clear, the gap between the auction
market and the parallel market was substantially reduced.  Also in September
1986, the ceiling on deposit interest rates was removed and that on bank
lending rates increased bv two per cent.  Continued upward pressure on
interest rates resulted in the removal of all controls on all bank interest
rates in  August 1987.  At the same time Treasury bill and other government
instrument rates were increased  by 4 percentage points.  Between mid-1986 and
end-1987 most deposit rates had risen by between 5 and 6 percentage points,
while lending rates had increased  by between 8 and 10 percentage points.
This still left interest rates negative in forward looking real terms.  It is
worth noting that the interest rate liberalization  appears to have resulted
in  wider bank interest  margins.  This could imply that  bank lending rates
were more constrained than others before the liberalization.  An attempt to
incorporate this is made in the qualitative measure 2, but not in the others.
A key question to be asked in considering these inflationary surges is
whether the inflation  was anticipated.  If not, much of the financial
taxation would have been ex post  in character.  There are two reasons for
believing that the acceleration could have been predicted.  For one thing,
the 1983-84 acceleration followed a sharp depreciation in the black-market
exchange rate.  Even if this was not an autonomous event, yet it should have
allowed prediction of the subsequent rise in domestic prices since the black-
market rate was increasingly the marginal cost of foreign exchange.  Again in
1988 the sharp depreciation of both official and black-market rates during
1986 would have heralded price pressures.  It therefore seems reasonable to
assume that the price accelerations were predicted.
Measure  1  findings:  Extremely  high burdens are estimated for 1982 and 1983
and again for 1987 and 1988, corresponding to the inflationary surges.
Average taxation 1982-88 was 5 per cent of GDP, and exceeded 40 per cent of
M2 at end 1987.  Almost one-half of this tax relates to interest ceilings on
non-government lending, thus providing a contrast to Ghana.  Overall, only
about one-quarter was currency tax.
ZAMBIA
Before 1985, the Zambian policy regime was characterized by ceilings on
interest rates.  Between 1971 and 1982 lending rate ceilings gradually
drifted up from 7 to 9.5 per cent, while the differential between the lending
and the deposit rates hovered between 2 and 3.5 percent.  The rigidity of the
ceilings for lending rates was therefore passed to deposit rates, which
resulted in strongly negative real rates during  bouts of inflation (minus 25
percent during the inflationary episode of 1976-1977).  The ceilings were
temporarily lifted in 1985-86,  but the increases  were too small to match the
acceleration of inflation.  As a consequence, the real rate of return on time
deposits was negative in all years (when inflation is measured with the CPI).
70The levels of the standard financial ratios (M2 and Ml to GDP) are shown in
the Figure A6 with a measure of the opportunity cost of money.  This cost is
defined as the opposite of the real rate of return, i.e., the difference
between the inflation rate and the rate of return of time deposits (with a 6
month maturity).  One would expect variations of the real rate of return on
financial assets to affect their level.  The empirical evidence does not show
such an effect; if anything it suggests a positive relation between money
holdings and the opportunity cost of money except at the very end of the
sample period when CPI inflation rate reached almost 50 percent.
The main episode of taxation of the financial system before 1985 occurred in
1975-1977 which presents the standard characteristics of the taxation of the
financial system after a commodity  boom.  The price of copper has a strong
effect on the economy and copper booms have always led to increases of
government expenditures.  This occurred after the  booms of 1966, 1969-1970,
and again 1973-1974.  The index of copper prices with respect to the domestic
price index (CPI) increased from 100 to 157  between 1972 and 1974, and then
fell to less than 90 in 1975 and 1976.  Government expenditures which had
increased in the boom, were not scaled down until 1978.  The government
deficit, which reached 20 percent of GDP was financed  mostly by borrowing
from commercial banks and from the Central Bank (and  not from abroad);  the
real level of loans by commercial banks to the private sector fell in each
year between 1975 and 1978.  The loans of the Central Bank resulted in
monetary expansion:  the monetary base increased  by 50 percent in 1975.
Revenue from financial taxes rose from about 2 percent of GDP to almost 7
percent of GDP in 1975.  It is  noteworthy that  most of the revenues were
raised by the subsidization of the government debt through interest ceilings
as government borrowing increased dramatically 7. The great increase in
internal government debt at the end of the period left the government
vulnerable to the temptation to reduce Its value by inflation.  There was no
significant attempt to raise more revenues through an increase of the reserve
requirement:  the reserve to deposit ratio increased only from 15 percent of
total bank deposits in 1975 to 20 percent in 1978.  Greater reliance on
increasing reserve requirements would have resulted in a lower overall
inflation rate and probably less distortion on the credit markets.
The tax burden on financial assets decreased dramatically in 1979 when fiscal
equilibrium was partially restored (mainly through a cut of expenditures)
though the deficit was still more than 6 percent of GDP.  The situation
worsened in the early eighties when the deficit exceeded 15 percent in 1980
to 1982.  However, inflation  was relatively low during this period.  A
possible explanation is that in this period, the deficit was financed
externally, whereas in the seventies, foreign  borrowing had been very small.
Interest rates ceilings were gradually raised during this period, but the
real rate of return on financial assets was still  negative.
Increasing reliance on domestic monetary financing, following  another slump
in copper exports in 1983-84, resulted in accelerating inflation during 1984
and 1985.  In this period a progressive liberalization of interest rates and
exchange rates took place.  For example. Treasury bills, which had been
quoted at less than 7.5 per cent in April 1984, reached 28 per cent by 1986,
following the general deregulation of interest rates and the introduction of
a daily market in Treasury bills in September 1985.  Short-term bank deposit
rates jumped from less than 5 per cent to 22 per cent in th  same period and
bank lending rates increased even faster, from 13 per cent to over 33 per
cent.  Note that hore too, as in Nigeria, bank interest  margins appear to
have widened with the liberalization.
7 These accounted for only 15% of the total of financial sector taxes in 1975
but for 82% in 1978.
71The foreign exchange auction was introduced in October 1985, more than a year
after the gap between official and parallel market rates nad substantially
widened. In the first three months following the introduction of the auction
the Kwacha fell from $0.45 to $0.18 (well  below the previous parallel market
rate: the currency's value on the parallel market also fell); by the end of
1986 it  was down to $0.088.
The higher interest rates and the loss of the implicit tax on exporters from
the overvalued official exchange rate) contributed to a significant worsening
of the fiscal position from the end of 1985.  The rapid acceleration of
inflation and the imposition of reserve requirements meant that the fiscal
burden on the financial system has since surpassed the level of the
mid-seventies.  (In real terms, reserve requirements almost doubled between
1983 and 1987).
Measure  1  Findings:  The burden of financial taxation  has varied sharply with
the surges of inflation and with the removal and re-imposition of interest
rate ceilings.  Since 1983 end-year measures have never fallen below 20 per
cent of M2, with the  highest rates in 1987 and 1988 (the latter over 60 per
cent).  The dip in the taxes at end-1985 is reversed at end-1986 (before
reregulation) by an increase in reserve requirements and in the currency tax,
as well as by a measured increase in the impact of interest ceilings 9. (Usir.g
quarterly instead of annual figures  would give a slightly different timing
pattern).  By end-1988, the interest ceilings  have become very constraining
and financial taxes have risen to almost 19 per cent of GNP, or more than the
total of explicit government revenue.
8 Following the reregulation of interest rates in February 1987, the Treasury
bill rate fell to 18%, that on short-term  deposits to 14.5% and on bank loans
to 23.7%.  When the foreign exchange auction market was abolished, the rate
was appreciated to $0.125.
9 Recall that Measure 1, by definition, interprets interest rates below
inflation as being subject to some policy influence, and therefore as
contributing to the tax.
72APPENDIX 3: MEASIREMENT PRECISLON FOR HIGH INFLATION COUNTRIES
TECHNICAL NOTE
If the effects of high inflation  are compounded over several months, they can
introduce  a distortion into the measure of financial sector taxes.  Our
approach is to take specific points in time and to compute the tax rates in
effect at those moments.  This requires using instantaneous, or continuously
compounded, rates of inflation and interest, as well as an estimate of the
flow of income at the particular time chosen  These refinements are
quantitatively important: take Gh-.ana  at end 1982, for example. The inflation
rate over the following twelve months was 143%.  Without making the
refinement the relevant initerest  rates would have been overstated by a factor
of 1.6, and the flow of GNP overstated by a factor of 1.3.  The basis for the
refinements is now illustrated  by a step-by-step derivation of the inflation
tax on currency.
(a).  Continuously  comRounde interest  rates, Suppose  a steady  rate  of
inflation  prevails so that the ECR is r (continuously  compounded).  Suppose
further that, at the prevailing rate of inflation the desired currency
holdings represent v  years of output y.  Suppose that currency holdings ct  are
revised every - years on the  basis of the flow of income expected before the
subsequent revision.  (Of  course we envisage that both vand  -rwould  be much
less than one.)  Then at a moment of revision t',
c,.  - Yfy,dt
Tax paid on this amount (at the continuously compounded rate r) over the
interval  -r  is
c,(  '- 1  )
Tax  as a share of output over the interval is:
C,(Q"  - 1)  y( 
If  y(t)dt
As the interval -c  is reduced towards zero, the average currency holdings as a
ratio to the flow of output (c/y) converges to the desired ratio a.  The
limiting value of tax as a share of output is:
yr.
73Thus we have shown that only by using the continuously compounded interest
rates in the formula will we obtain the correct tax rates.
(b) Te  flow_  2f income at end-year,  The rate of income flow in the above
equations is not the average flow during the year, but the rate at the moment
in question.  If that moment is the end of the year, data is available in
practice only for the income flow over the previous twelve  months and the
subsequent twelve months.  Even if the real flow of income  was roughly
constant during that 24-month interval, the flow in nominal terms will not
have been constant because of inflation, and simply taking an unweighted
average of the two years will not give a good estimate if inflation is high.
Thus, writing YA and YB for the previous and following year income flows, we
have:
YA=  ytdt  Y=J  y,dt.
Assuming previous and following year inflation to be constant at n.,n,
respectively, we can write
y-  yOexp(x,t),  t <O,
y,=yoexp('At).  t>O.
We integrate to obtain:
Y  Ay°(-e  X  P(-  '  A  t))
3J  A
- YO( 1 - tS
w-  y±CexpCztt)-l  ).
It,
In  practice,  because  the assumption on constant inflation and zero growth are
not quite true, these  will give two different solutions when solved for yo.
We take the average of the two solutions for the formula used in the
empirical calculations:
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  __Ay  It  5 )' 8
Y°'°  5(1-exp(-it,t)  exp(C,t)-  1)i
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